2013/07/30

Keynes's Economics in the Making


                 

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Keynes’s Economics in the Making

Toshiaki Hirai

Introduction

Since the publication of Keynes’s General Theory (1936) and the advent of the “Keynesian Revolution,” many scholars have attempted to interpret Keynes’s book and its impact. These Keynesian scholars have put forward their own Keynesian theories or their own versions of Keynes’s theories: among the various approaches, the income-expenditure approach, normally taken as the orthodox position; the Post-Keynesian approach, of which there are many versions; and the disequilibrium approach have proven influential. We are, of course, well acquainted with the fierce attacks launched by outsiders, such as the exponents of monetarism and the New Classical macroeconomics, but controversies proving no less fierce also developed within the “Keynes Camp.”

Almost all the above interpretations focus solely on the General Theory, disregarding Keynes’s other economic writings. Since the mid-1970s, however, a new line of research on Keynes’s economics has been developed, with studies of Keynes’s economics based on the Keynes Papers.1 The present study belongs to this genre and has two purposes. The first is to clarify a feature of the Cambridge school in the first half of the twentieth century through examination of business cycle theories, identifying in particular two streams—the “Marshallian tradition” and the “Wicksell-type theories.”.

The second purpose is to clarify Keynes’s theoretical development from the Treatise on Money to the General Theory. Here I will address two tasks, namely, analysis of the theoretical structures of the Treatise and the General Theory and examination and interpretation of each stage of development based on various manuscripts and correspondence contained in the Keynes Papers.

Two strands within the Cambridge school—with regard to business cycle theories

Within the Cambridge school, two trends can be distinguished in business cycle theories. One trend, represented by Pigou and Lavington, drew its inspiration from Marshall’s theory, the “Marshallian tradition,” while the other, represented by Robertson, Hawtrey, and Keynes (in the Treatise), was—consciously or unconsciously—to take up a Wicksell-type theory and came to contribute greatly to the development of monetary economics, along with Lindahl and Myrdal (the Stockholm school) and Mises and Hayek (the Austrian school).

Marshall and the Marshallian tradition

Marshall’s economic system is comprised of three theories: the theory of exchange through supply-demand equilibrium, the (cash balance) quantity theory of money, and the theory of business cycles.2

Marshall put forward the theory of exchange, in Principles of Economics (1890), as a theory of stable equilibrium of normal supply and demand, which, assuming the constancy of both the marginal utility of money and the general purchasing power of money and confining the object of analysis to one commodity, provides an effective way of working out intertemporal problems.

Marshall presented his version of the quantity theory of money around 1871. He was doubtful of the transaction approach as formulated by Fisher on the grounds that it does not specify the factors that govern the velocity of the circulation of currency. Instead, Marshall stresses the “influence which the credit of a currency exerts on the willingness of the population to hold much of their resources, either directly in the form of cash in hand and at a bank; or indirectly in the form of debentures and other stock exchange securities” (Marshall 1923, p.º47). This idea is the ultimate germ of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference. It should be noted that Marshall also considers that the so-called Marshallian k moves in inverse proportion to an increase in the supply of money, so that an increase in the supply of money would decrease the value of each unit of money more than proportionately. Marshall develops the above argument subject to general credit being normal.

Marshall’s theory of business cycles was first expounded in the Economics of Industry (Marshall and Marshall 1879). Here he analyzes the case where the general credit structure is shaken. This theory of business cycles is characterized by three points given particular stress. First, there is the role played by the public psychology, and in particular by moods of confidence or diffidence, in causing fluctuations in the level of economic activity. Confidence breeds confidence in the upward phase, while diffidence breeds diffidence in the downward phase.

Second, we have the “multiplier process,” invoked in explaining the working of the economy. In both the upward and downward phases, change occurs first in the investment goods sector. This is followed by change in the demand for consumption goods, induced by the increased incomes of those newly employed in the investment goods sector. Third, there is the role played by speculators in causing excessive economic fluctuations.

Essentially, Marshall sees the chief cause of depression as a lack in confidence, which undermines credit. In consequence, the economy fails to adjust means to ends. The solution he comes up with is to ensure that credit is managed within narrower limits. Compared with the theory of exchange developed in Principles of Economics, Marshall’s theory of business cycles was rather patchy. The work of developing it was left to his disciples, Pigou and Lavington.

Pigou developed his argument in Industrial Fluctuations (1927), which is an extended version of part VI, “The Variability of the National Dividend,” of Economics of Welfare (1920). Pigou takes fluctuations in the level of employment, which is given by the intersection of the supply schedule of labor with the demand schedule for labor, as the main statistical indicator of industrial fluctuations. Starting with this fundamental proposition, Pigou argues that the proximate causes of industrial fluctuations lie in the deviations in the demand schedule from its general trend. He goes on to argue that changes in the demand for labor, in turn, come about either through changes in the expectations of entrepreneurs with regard to the real yield obtainable from investment (“industrial spending”) or through changes in the size of real income, and he concludes that the dominant causal factor is the former rather than the latter. Thus, in Pigou’s view, the varying expectations of business people are the most important factor contributing to industrial fluctuations (see Pigou 1927, p.º34).

Pigou’s theory is based mainly on two analyses: (a) of the factors governing the amplitude of industrial fluctuations and (b) of the factors governing their rhythmic nature.

With regard to analysis a, Pigou argues that the amplitude of industrial fluctuations depends both on the initial causes and on the environmental conditions in which the initial causes have effect. The initial causes of variations in expectations of the profit to be had from industrial spending include real causes, such as harvest variations, new inventions, industrial disputes, wars, and changes in fashion; psychological causes, particularly errors of optimism or pessimism; and autonomous monetary causes.

The environmental conditions mentioned as influencing the amplitude of industrial fluctuations are monetary and banking arrangements (the principal problem here is forced saving); the policy adopted by industrialists with regard to spoiling the market; and the policy pursued by laborers aiming at making wage rates rigid.

Reacting to the environmental conditions, the initial causes that set industrial fluctuations in motion determine their amplitude. In this argument, Pigou places great emphasis on the multiplier process and the influences that excessive oscillations in the psychology of entrepreneurs have on the economy.

With regard to analysis b, Pigou identifies two major sets of causes. The first is causes that, though sporadic in nature, start off wave movements once they have come into play: the tendency of human constructions to wear out after a certain interval; the alteration of optimistic and pessimistic errors among entrepreneurs; and processes relating to money. The other causes comprise recurrent factors linked to the periodicity of actual industrial movements.

Pigou’s theory of industrial fluctuations is deeply rooted in psychological forces. He stresses that alternation of optimistic and pessimistic errors is the main factor governing both the amplitude and the rhythmic nature of industrial fluctuations. It should be noted, however, that in developing his argument Pigou pays attention to both real and monetary causes, as well as the multiplier process.



Lavington was a Cambridge economist, best known for his book The English Capital Market (1921). Lavington first argues that the service that the money market is able to render consists of two activities, namely, the manufacture of money and the transportation of capital. To provide the latter service is to facilitate “the movement of this stream of money, of Command over Capital, whereby the control over a part of the productive resources of society which is available for capital uses is transferred into the hands of those by whom it can most effectively be employed” (Lavington 1921, p.º12). This service is thus related to forced saving. Lavington then proceeds to analyze the money market, both in the normal state (i.e., where the level of credit is normal) and in the abnormal state (i.e., where the confidence to grant credit has been shaken). Lavington’s theory of the trade cycle consists in an analysis of the money market in the abnormal state.

Because the treatment in the English Capital Market is somewhat dispersed, it is better to follow the more straightforward account in the Trade Cycle (Lavington 1922). The key ideas there are drawn from Marshall, Pigou, and Robertson (in A Study of Industrial Fluctuation, 1915).

Lavington’s basic proposition is two-pronged. On the one hand, he presents the conditions conducive to rhythmic variations in the level of business activity. Modern industrial systems are equipped with features inducing rhythmic patterns and/or cumulative changes—the organization of production by independent entrepreneurs, the decision-making process applied by entrepreneurs based on forecasts rather than facts, and the mutual interdependence of entrepreneurs (Lavington 1922, pp.º52–53).

On the other hand, he exposes the causes that, operating under these conditions, actually induce the rhythmic patterns. The main cause is to be found, he argues, in changes in the level of business confidence. Lavington develops this basic proposition as follows:

First, he assumes that a rise (or fall) in the level of business confidence always induces an increase (or decrease) in business activity.

Second, he emphasizes both the multiplier process and changes in the level of business confidence, taking the effective purchasing power of society into consideration.

Third, he does not consider monetary factors to be important in causing industrial fluctuations. He argues that the principal factors inducing industrial fluctuations have direct relation neither to the price level nor to the monetary or nonmonetary nature of the economy. That said, he accepts that we do actually live in a monetary economy, in which a rise in the level of business confidence causes an increase in purchasing power and thus induces a rise in the price level, which in turn leads to a rise in the level of confidence. This process develops in a cumulative way.

Fourth, and most important, Lavington argues that it is essentially the changes in the level of business confidence that determine the amplitude and periodicity of the trace cycle (Lavington 1922, p.º92).

Pigou’s and Lavington’s theories of industrial fluctuations represent the Marshallian tradition, in which business confidence, as the psychological factor, and the multiplier process, through which the impact of this confidence is diffused, occupy key positions.

The Wicksell-type theories

In the 1920s and 1930s, immanent criticism of neoclassical economics, as composed of the theory of relative prices and the quantity theory of money, gave rise to an array of monetary economics deeply influenced by Wicksell (1898). Wicksell himself endorsed the theory of relative prices in the form of Walrasian general equilibrium theory-cum-Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory, while he put forward the theory of the cumulative process of capital formation as an alternative to the quantity theory.

Accepting the essential points made by Wicksell, the interwar economists, including Lindahl and Myrdal (the Stockholm school) as well as Mises and Hayek (the Austria school), put forward their own brand of monetary economics, going beyond Wicksell and criticizing the neoclassical dichotomy per se (see Hirai 2008, chap.º2). Let us call them “Wicksell’s influences.” Robertson, Keynes, and Hawtrey were the “Wicksell-type theorists” in interwar Cambridge.

Lines of thinking departing from the Marshallian tradition were initiated in Cambridge by Robertson (1926) under the strong influence of Aftalion and Cassel. In his book, Robertson incorporated the relation between savings, credit creation, and capital accumulation into the nonmonetary argument developed in Robertson (1915). Although Robertson was not directly influenced by Wicksell, his theory shares some of the same essential components, and indeed Myrdal and Hayek evaluated Robertson highly on the grounds that he was dealing with similar problems using similar methods. It would not, therefore, be inappropriate to view Robertson’s theory as a sort of Wicksell-type theory.

Keynes was greatly influenced by Robertson, and it was very much thanks to this influence that he was able to evolve from his position in A Tract on Monetary Reform to that of the Treatise. In his case, however, he was aware of his theory’s place among Wicksell’s influences . (Keynes is dealt with more below.)

It is also appropriate to consider Hawtrey in this context. Hawtrey developed his theory of the trade cycle in Good and Bad Trade (1913), which may be regarded as independent of both the Marshallian tradition and the Wicksell’s influences but closer to the latter than the former.

Robertson.Æ The title “Banking Policy and the Price Level” encapsulates Robertson’s main theme in that work: that a policy of credit creation on the part of the banking system enables entrepreneurs to purchase the real capital necessary to boost production, which in turn induces an increase in money supply and thus in the price level of consumables. Production increases in the following period. Although he adopts a variant of the quantity theory in this argument, Robertson denies, in substance, the classical dichotomy.

Unlike monetary theories such as those found in Hawtrey (1913) and Keynes (1923), and also unlike psychological theories such as that set forth in Pigou (1927), Robertson’s theory takes the interaction between real and monetary factors seriously. He divides the fluctuations in output into “appropriate” and “inappropriate” categorizations. Appropriate fluctuations, which are closely related to the technical and legal structure of the modern economy, follow a rhythmical pattern to be justified. Inappropriate fluctuations, which are constituted by the excess of actual fluctuations in the volume of output over what would be appropriate ones, occur due to the use of large and expensive equipment.

Monetary factors are related to the activities of the banking system. In order to increase the volume of output, real circulating capital is correspondingly required in advance. In order to purchase it, the need arises to procure the corresponding short lacking. When firms cannot arrive at the whole amount of short lacking required, it is the banking system that provides the balance. The consumption goods produced in the economy are either consumed by the public or used by the firms as circulating capital. When the firms’ demand for circulating capital is strong, the public must of necessity be deprived of consumption goods. This is facilitated by the banking system providing credit to the firms.

Robertson develops his theory in two cases: short lacking and short and long lacking (where investment goods play an important role), but for the sake of brevity, let us here focus on the latter case. (Lacking is Robertson’s somewhat awkward term for savings. )

In this case, the idea of the “demand and supply of short lacking” plays a central role. In accordance with the phases of the trade cycle, changes in the level of demand for and supply of short lacking follow different courses. How the economy deals with this difference depends on the behavior of the banking system. Here let us examine the upward phase.

In order to increase the volume of output, circulating capital needs to be purchased. For this, procurement of short lacking is indispensable. The supply of short lacking, however, is made by “hoarding.” Hoarding is a kind of lacking that occurs where money obtained by selling current output is saved without any guarantee of being applied to the creation of capital. The supply of short lacking does not increase flexibly enough to cope with a large and discontinuous increase in the demand for it.

Large excess demand for short lacking is met only with provision of credit by the banking system (see Robertson 1949, pp.º50 and 72). The consequence for the economy as a whole means forced saving.

When short lacking is thus met, the required circulating capital is procured, so that the volume of production increases. The amount of money then increases, and consequently the price level rises. Once this rise occurs, excess demand for short lacking persistently arises due to an increase in consumption or investment by firms, a lengthening of the period of production, a dis-hoarding by consumers, and a direct short lacking by firms. If the banking system goes on supplying money in order to cope with the excess demand, the price level goes on rising cumulatively.

If the banking system provides no credit, firms cannot procure the short lacking required; thus, circulating capital cannot be sufficiently obtained and the volume of production shows no sufficient increase. In this case, the amount of money does not increase, and the price level remains stable.

Thus, stability in the volume of production is placed in a trade-off relation with that in the price level. Such is the feature of the modern capitalistic economy revealed by Robertson’s theory.

Hawtrey.ÆHawtrey’s theory of the trade cycle is uniquely monetary in the sense that it sees the main cause of the business cycle in the behavior of banks. The banks attempt to adjust the amount of credit money to a level appropriate to their cash holdings. When they judge the ratio to be inappropriate, they raise (or lower) the rate of interest to decrease (or increase) the amount of credit money. This behavior is argued to induce industrial fluctuations, for it causes the fluctuations in cash (mainly payment to wages) to lag behind those in credit money (which makes up the purchasing power).

Now, let us consider the case in which the banks judge the ratio to be in excess and raise the (short-term) rate of interest to reduce the excess. Hawtrey goes on to explain two major aspects of the fluctuations thus induced. One is that the dealers reduce their orders to the manufacturers due to the increased cost of holding goods. The manufacturers, in turn, cut back their production. Both the dealers and the manufacturers then reduce their borrowings from the banks, which decreases the amount of credit money. The other aspect is that due to the decrease in the amount of credit money, the purchasing power directed toward goods decreases.

Due to the interaction between these two aspects, the economy spirals downward. During this course, wholesale prices, retail prices, and wages go on falling. Between interest rate, wages, and prices, it is the prices that fall most drastically, so that the rate of profits comes to diverge increasingly from the rate of interest. Although wages go on falling as unemployment develops, the fluctuations in wages are not as large as those in prices. Thus, the banks’ cash holdings come to be in excess relative to the amount of credit money, and the banks reduce the (short-term) rate of interest to increase the amount of credit money. The process of expansion then begins to develop, reversing the sequence just explained.

The development of Keynes’s economics

In the above section, we saw two strands in Cambridge economics concerning business cycle theories. Where does Keynes stand in all this? Finding the answer requires some careful work uncovering the evolution of Keynes’s thought between the Treatise and the General Theory.

Keynes published the Treatise in 1930 after seven years’ intellectual struggle following A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923).3 The Treatise has a Wicksellian influence. Keynes made great efforts to defend the Treatise from both internal and the external criticisms up until the end of 1932. He then began to change the line of his argument in a direction that was to lead up to the General Theory. This can be characterized as a zigzag process. Finally, I will describe the main features of the General Theory and draw comparison between the Treatise and the General Theory. This will then allow us to see the ultimate outcome of the two influences upon Keynes’s own theory of the business cycle.

The Treatise theory

The most significant feature of the Treatise theory might arguably be considered the coexistence of a Wicksellian theory and “Keynes’s own theory” (see Hirai 2008, chap.º5).

On the one hand, the Treatise has Wicksellian influences, for Keynes tries to construct his own theory of monetary economics, criticizing both Marshall’s quantity theory of money (see Keynes 1930, vol. 1, p.º205) and business cycle theory, which emphasizes the behavior of speculators while embracing Wicksell’s view.

The Wicksellian strand of thought in the Treatise can be discerned in the following points: the explanation of the fluctuations in price level in terms of a relative relation between the natural rate and money rate of interest, and explanation of the working of the economy based on this relation; the stress on a bank-rate policy for stabilizing the price level; and the acceptance of an equivalence between Wicksell’s three conditions for monetary equilibrium.4

The principal grounds on which Keynes himself regards his theory as belonging to the Wicksellian stream, however, lie rather in his adoption of the idea that the bank rate influences investment and saving. This idea is used to provide a mechanism to the effect that economic stability (stability of the price level and the volume of output) can be attained by means of interest rate policy.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the Treatise has “Keynes’s own theory” as well. This theory consists of two parts. The first addresses the determination of variables relating to consumption goods and investment goods in “each period”:

(Mechanism 1) The cost of production and the volume of output are determined at the beginning of the current period. Once the expenditure for consumption goods is determined on the basis of earnings, it is automatically realized as the sale of consumption goods proceeds, and the price level as well as the amount of profit are simultaneously determined.

(Mechanism 2) The cost of production and the volume of output are determined at the beginning of the current period. The price level of investment goods is determined either in the stock market or as the demand price of capital goods. Profit is determined as a result.

The second part deals with the determination of variables between one period and the next:

(Mechanism 3) The behavior of entrepreneurs is such that, if they make a profit (loss) in the current period, they expand (contract) output in the next.

I will call this last relation the “TM supply function.” Stimulated by the profits (losses) realized in the two sectors, the firms behave in such a way as to expand (or contract) output in the next period. Given output thus determined, Mechanisms 1 and 2 function accordingly. “Keynes’s own theory” can thus be expressed as the dynamic process consisting of Mechanisms 1 and 2 working through Mechanism 3.

As a result of this process (which can be called short-period oscillations), the economy may or may not reach long-period equilibrium. Keynes argues that the duty of the monetary authority is to achieve long-period equilibrium by means of bank-rate policy.

In long-period equilibrium, profits are supposed to become zero, investment is supposed to become equal to saving, and the price level is supposed to become stable. Keynes remarks that “every change towards a new equilibrium price level is initiated by a departure of profits from zero” (Keynes 1930, vol. 1, p.º142).

This interpretation sees the Treatise as articulating a dynamic process that includes the determination of both the price levels and the volumes of output.

It should be noted that the Treatise theory thus interpreted involves three kinds of “dualities,” offering alternative and not always compatible analyses. These are the duality of the theory concerning the price level of consumption goods, a theory dependent on either (a) earnings or (b) the rate of interest; the duality of the theory concerning the price level of investment goods, either (c) the bearishness function theory or (d) the idea that prospective yields are discounted by the rate of interest; and finally, the duality of Wicksellian theory and Keynes’s own theory.

The third duality rests on the other two. The Wicksellian theory, which is mainly used in the argument of economic policy by means of the bank rate in the second volume of the Treatise, adopts b and d, while Keynes’s own theory adopts a and c.

The process of development after the Treatise

What characterizes the period up to mid-1932 was that Keynes maintained and improved upon “Keynes’s own theory,” disregarding the Wicksellian theory.5 It is important to appreciate how Keynes dealt with the relation between profits and the volume of output. In the Treatise, the “TM supply function” was stressed as expressing the dynamic mechanism. Keynes adhered to the function (see his letter to Joan Robinson, CWK 13, p.º380) in the face of considerable criticism. This stance emerges clearly from the manuscript entitled “The Monetary Theory of Production” drafted in mid-1932 (CWK 13, pp.º381–396).

Toward the end of 1932 (see Hirai 2004; 2008, chap.º7), Keynes abandoned the TM supply function, albeit with some hesitation, and put forward a new formula of a system of commodity markets in the manuscript entitled “The Parameters of a Monetary Economy” (CWK 13, pp.º397–405). Here the TM supply function virtually disappeared from the analysis of commodity markets, as a result of which there emerged the model consisting of a system of simultaneous equations based on the equality of investment and saving in which profits do not relate to the determination of prices and output, thereby departing sharply from “Keynes’s own theory.” This was a turning point toward the General Theory.

In the three manuscripts of 1933 (see Hirai 2008, chap.º8), two functions are emphasized—the “pseudo-TM supply function” (see Hirai 2008, pp.º104–105 and 107) and the “pseudo-TM supply function mk2.” I use the prefix “pseudo” because the functions, in substance, differ from the (original) TM supply function, although Keynes tends to regard these two functions as continuous with the TM supply function.

The three manuscripts constitute the origins of the General Theory’s chapter 3. They conceivably discuss both an equilibrium condition for the level of employment and its stability condition, although no concept corresponding to the General Theory’s aggregate supply function appears. In the “First Manuscript” (CWK 13, pp.º62–66), Keynes first put forward a system for determining the level of employment. This was, indeed, a breakthrough.

Keynes’s way of formulating the system, however, suffers from certain ambiguities. The central problem in examining the three manuscripts is how consistently one can explain the “Second Manuscript” (CWK 29, pp.º63, 66–73, 87–92, 95–102), which accepts the first postulate of the classical economics, using the concept of the accounting period, and yet succeeds the pseudo-TM supply function mk2. I interpret the pseudo-TM supply function mk2 as describing the stability condition for the equilibrium level of employment. But the argument in terms of the function remains unclear. Moreover, the argument in the “Third Manuscript” (CWK 29, p.º76–101; CWK 13, pp.º421–422), which emphasizes “effective demand,”6 is somewhat confusing, for it is still developed in terms of the sale proceeds and variable cost. The arguments recognizable in the Second and Third Manuscripts were to disappear thereafter. This has very much to do with the fact that the role played by profit was to change drastically. These ambiguities show how Keynes struggled to work out a new employment theory.

In the “First Undated Manuscript” (CWK 29, pp.º102–111; see Hirai 2008, chap.º9), Keynes appears to have first established the fundamental psychological law and the multiplier theory, while in the “Second Undated Manuscript” (CWK 29, pp.º112–120), he first put forward an investment theory close to that of the General Theory (both were written either toward the end of 1933 or in the first half of 1934).

Thus, the end of 1933 saw Keynes making a great advance toward the General Theory. Piecing together the arguments made in the fragments concerned, we can confirm that Keynes had by then established the following points: the system of determining the level of employment, the consumption function, the fundamental psychological law, the liquidity preference theory,7 the marginal efficiency of capital8 (albeit not yet that of the General Theory), and the multiplier theory.

In the manuscript “The General Theory” (CWK 13, pp.º423–456; see Hirai 2008, chap.º10, “The Eve of the General Theory”) of the spring of 1934, and also in “The Summer Manuscript” (CWK 13, pp.º471–484) of the same year, which comprises the revised versions of chapters 8 and 9 of “The General Theory,” Keynes puts forward almost the same theoretical framework as that of the General Theory in the area of consumption and investment theories. However, it should be noted that some theoretical ambiguity still remains in the concept of effective demand and the theory of determination of the level of employment. Thus, we might call this period the “Eve of the General Theory.”

The proofing process of the General Theory (see Hirai 2008, chaps. 11–12) continued from the summer of 1934 up to publication. Here I set myself two objectives, namely, to determine (a) how Keynes went through the proofing process and (b) what the main features are.

With regard to objective a, the following points emerge: Galley1(I) (chaps. 1–19, between early December 1934 and mid-January 1935) represents the most considerably revised work on the topics covered in the table of contents shared by three galleys (see CWK 13, pp.º525–526), while Galley2 (chaps. 1–15, between January and April 1935) and Galley3 (chaps. 2–6, June 1935) represent stylistic revisions of Galley1(I); all the chapters, except for chaps. 4, 5, 12, and 13, were completed in Galley1(I) both in contents and at the stylistic level. (There is also Galley1(II), chaps. 20–25, from March 1935 on.) The largest change after Galley1(III) (chaps. 26–28, June–July 1935) occurred in “The Great Revision” (chaps. 3 and 6–9, in August–October; see Hirai 2008, pp.º159–171). The definitions of some fundamental concepts changed due to alterations both in the definition of “user cost” and in its treatment; in the Michaelmas lectures (November 18), the precautionary motive was argued to be dependent on the rate of interest.

In the case of objective b, I focused on what kind of changes or difficulties can be detected in the latter half of Keynes’s process of development. Here we find two major changes worth noting, one regarding the “employment function,” the other concerning fundamental concepts.

In “The General Theory,” the Summer Manuscript, and the Pre-first Proof Typescript (summer 1934), the employment function was used as both supply and equilibrium concept. This duality disappears in Galley1(I) up to and including Galley3. In the General Theory, however, the duality reappears and overshadows its theoretical structure (see Hirai 2008, pp.º186–191).

Some fundamental concepts in Galley1(I) are related to those in the General Theory as follows:

The difference in effective demand, investment, and prime cost in definition depends on whether they include user cost (Galley1(I)) or not (the General Theory). From Galley1(I) to Galley III, for example, Keynes argued that income as realized value consistently differed from effective demand as expected value by user cost, emphasizing that effective demand inclusive of user cost matters in determining the level of employment. In the General Theory, however, this idea has disappeared.

The definitions of income, profit, and saving are the same.

The equation U2 = U1 - B is vital in grasping the relation (where U2 is the user cost in the General Theory; U1 is user cost in Galley 1(I); and B is cost of the maintenance and improvement of the initial capital equipment).

The main thread runs as follows: In the Treatise, the “TM supply function” is stressed as expressing the dynamic mechanism. Keynes adhered to this function after the Treatise, in spite of much criticism. Toward the end of 1932, he abandoned it with some hesitation, and from the First Manuscript of 1933 on put forward a new theory of employment, which led to the General Theory.

The General Theory

Through the above zigzag process we have seen, in February 1936 Keynes finally published the General Theory, destined to spark off the Keynesian Revolution. At this point, we must take a look at the essential points of the General Theory (see Hirai 2008, chap.º13).

There are three central themes we can identify as running through the General Theory: contrasting potentialities, monetary economics, and underemployment equilibrium.

The General Theory sees the market economy as possessing two contrasting sets of potentialities: stability, certainty, and simplicity, on the one hand; and instability, uncertainty, and complexity, on the other.

Keynes argues that the market economy is equipped with several built-in stabilizers and thus has an inherent tendency to converge to equilibrium. It does not, however, reach an optimum (or full-employment) level but, rather, stays at an underemployment level. Based on this “optimistic” vision, he constructs a theoretical model in which the level of employment is determined where the aggregate demand function intersects the aggregate supply function, making use of such concepts as the consumption function, the marginal efficiency of capital, and the liquidity preference theory. The model is constructed in a simple and straightforward way, providing the foundations upon which Keynes presents his economic policy proposals for attaining full employment.

At the same time, however, Keynes repeatedly argues that the stability to which the market economy tends cannot set in unless some conditions are met; failing these, the market economy is doomed to instability. In this respect, we are faced with a structure built on fragile foundations, reflecting the uncertainty and complexity to be observed in the market economy.

Keynes argues that the working of the market economy depends on various psychological factors, such as short-term expectations, long-term expectations (the marginal efficiency of capital and the nature of the stock market), liquidity preference, and user cost.

The other element making the market economy unstable is its vulnerability to large changes in some exogenous variables. Here Keynes’s concern is above all about any substantial changes in the quantity of money or in money wages.

Keynes seems confident that the possibility that the market economy will be undermined through the falling away of the above-mentioned conditions is remote and that an economy stuck in underemployment equilibrium could be cured with policies such as public works programs and low interest-rate policies.

Keynes puts forward his theory of underemployment equilibrium as monetary economics, as distinct from the real economics to which “classical economics” belongs. He argues that the monetary economy in which we live can be analyzed only within a framework of monetary economics.

Keynes’s fundamental idea is expounded in chapter 21, where he presents two new ways of dividing up economics. One is a division “between the theory of the individual industry or firm and of the rewards and the distribution between different uses of a given quantity of resources on the one hand, and the theory of output and employment as a whole on the other hand” (1936, p.º293). The other is a division “between the theory of stationary equilibrium and the theory of shifting equilibrium—meaning by the latter the theory of a system in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the present situation” (ibid.).

In both cases, the criterion of division hinges on money. Indeed, when dealing with the determination of the level of output and employment as a whole in the real world, we must consider the role played by money. This is what Keynes means by monetary economics. Keynes argues that monetary economics in his sense remains “a theory of value and distribution, not a separate ‘theory of money’” (1936, p.º294).

The above considerations show that Keynes’s monetary economics aims at analyzing an economy in which money plays an essential role. It is not surprising, then, that Keynes allocates a lot of room to discussion of the rate of interest (chaps. 13, 14, 15, 17, 23, and 24). Apart from his liquidity preference theory, Keynes, in chapter 17, develops a theory of “own-rates of interest,” accounting for the way in which the behavior of money becomes an obstacle to full employment.

The central message of the General Theory is that left to itself, the market economy will remain in underemployment equilibrium (see 1936, pp.º249–250). Underemployment equilibrium has four features: involuntary unemployment, equilibrium, stability, and fluctuation.

We may, indeed, go as far as saying that the theoretical structure of the General Theory can be characterized as the monetary economics of underemployment equilibrium.

Comparison

The General Theory would not have appeared but for the Treatise, and yet it is an achievement independent of it.

First, in the Treatise, the TM supply function plays an essential role in the dynamic movement of the system; the General Theory addresses the question of how the level of employment is determined.9

Second, the Treatise provides no theoretical account of investment and consumption; in the General Theory, theories of both investment and consumption are put forward and play important roles in determining the volume of employment.

Third, although we can find some continuity between the concepts of bearishness and liquidity preference (respectively , the view that the banking system and the public, with their psychological inclinations, behave interactively; and classification of the motives for holding money), the role assigned to money differs considerably.

Fourth, in the Treatise, the rate of interest is a policy variable through which the banking system is supposed to adjust the supply of money to the public’s bearishness; in the General Theory, the rate of interest is supposed to be adjusted in such a way that the supply of money, which is a policy variable, meets the liquidity preference.

Fifth, the Treatise and the General Theory nevertheless have the following points in common: both belong to the field of monetary economics and were pitched against neoclassical orthodoxy, prices and output are treated as endogenous variables, and the importance of both monetary and fiscal policies is stressed.

Conclusion

This chapter began by identifying two strands in Cambridge with regard to business cycle theories in order to position Keynes correctly. It should be remembered that Keynes was ranked as highly as Pigou, Robertson, and Hawtrey before the General Theory, although he was the most famous of the four outside the academic world.

I then put forward my interpretation, based on the Keynes Papers, of how Keynes developed his theory from the Treatise to the General Theory.

From the late nineteenth century on, economists increasingly concentrated their attention on the phenomenon of exchange in the market. They were concerned with the problem of how resources are exchanged through the price mechanism, assuming full employment and accepting Say’s law.

A new approach to economics was initiated by Wicksell at the turn of the century. He put forward the theory of cumulative process as an alternative to the quantity theory. A number of economists of diverse intellectual backgrounds emerged in the interwar period to follow up Wicksell’s lead. They were united in their desire to construct a new monetary economics, criticizing the quantity theory, the classical dichotomy, and Say’s law. Keynes was one of these economists.

Keynes, however, dispensed with the Wicksellian influence soon after the Treatise and ultimately arrived at the General Theory. In doing so, he returned to his own roots in Cambridge cycle theory. Here we have a monetary economics that demonstrates underemployment equilibrium. It was an independent achievement, and it generated the Keynesian Revolution.

Having said that, I think that Keynes’s methodology, as well as his economics, is of extreme importance at present. It was never as ends in themselves that Keynes constructed his theoretical models but always for the purpose of analyzing and diagnosing the economic problems facing the real economy and proposing polices to deal with them. While observing the real economy, Keynes sought out useful analytical tools or concepts or, when necessary, contrived new tools or concepts applying his own intuition and introspection. These he would then set about elaborating with his powers of speculation.

Reference here to “theoretical models” does not necessarily imply only mathematical models. Keynes perceived the complexity of the economy, which could not be dealt with using only mathematical models. Thus, as argued above, Keynes’s theoretical models are built in such a way that the market economy is equipped with two contrasting potentialities. To this end, Keynes took great pains in constructing his models, showing how the level of employment is determined on the one hand, while at the same time giving due weight to the aspect of uncertainty on the other.

The last thirty years have seen the emergence of the “New Classical” school (see Lucas 1975; Kydland and Prescott 1982) as the dominant orthodoxy in macroeconomics. The exponents of this school explicitly and utterly rejected Keynes’s economics, his way of thinking, and his social philosophy, arguing the superiority of their models as being constructed rigorously and mathematically from microeconomic foundations. But Keynes would surely have been highly critical of them as being based on the “representative agent,” assumed to maximize his/her utility and to be able to form “rational expectations.” By assuming this type of homo oeconomicus, the New Classical economists construct their models with “pseudo-mathematical methods” (Keynes 1936, p.º297), which do not go a long way toward analyzing the real economy. I believe that we should welcome the return of Keynes in this sense, rather than blindly following the New Classical school.

Notes

1. Keynes Papers, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge.

2. This section is based on Hirai (2003, sec. 2 of chap.º2).

3. Marshall’s economic system is examined in Hirai (2007a; 2008, chap.º4).

4. Wicksell’s three conditions for monetary equilibrium are equality of the natural rate and the money rate of interest, equality of investment and saving, and price level stability.

5. See Hirai (2008, chaps. 6–12). For studies focusing on the same theme, see Asano 1987; Dimand 1987; Amadeo 1989. Rymes (1989) is also an important source of information.

6. It should be noted that the concept of “effective demand” was to undergo several changes before reaching the General Theory.

7. Keynes’s liquidity preference theory is first developed in “The Monetary Theory of Production.”

8. Keynes’s theory of the marginal efficiency of capital is first developed in “The Second Undated Manuscript.”

 
9. I also reconstruct the General Theory theory in terms of the “heterogeneity-expectations approach,” pointing out some flaws in the original. See Hirai (2008, pp.º184–191).

The Return to Keynes, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press




The Return to Keynes  Keynes and Keynesian Policies in the New Millennium
ed. by B.
Bateman, T. Hirai, M.C. Marcuzzo,

The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010

The Return to Keynes:



Contents

Introduction

Bradley Bateman (DenisonUniversity), Toshiaki Hirai (Sophia University) and Maria Cristina Marcuzzo (University of Rome, La Sapienza)

Part I

Keynesian Economic Policy: past and present



1. United States

Bradley Bateman (Denison College)



2. Japan

Yoshiyasu Ono (Osaka University )

3. Europe

Hans-Michael Trautwein (University of Oldenburg)

Part II Theory

4. Keynesian and Wicksellian Issues in Relation to the New Neo-classical Synthesis

Mauro Boianovsky (University of Brasilia) and Hans-Michael Trautwein (University of Oldenburg)



5. Tobin’s Keynesianism

Ryan Bruno (Brock University) and Robert Dimand (Brock University)



6. J.M. Keynes and International Finance

Marcello De Cecco (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa)



7. Present State of Macroeconomics

Richard Arena (University of Nice)



8. Critical Analysis of Macroeconomics from Keynesian Point of View

Hiroshi Yoshikawa (University of Tokyo)



9. Financial Instability

Ian Kregel (Levy Institute)

Part III. Lessons of Recent Literature on Keynes



10. Keynes’s Life and his Work

Gilles Dostaler (University of Quebec at Montreal)



11. The Keynes’s papers

Toshiaki Hirai (Sophia University)



12. Keynes and Sraffa

Heinz Kurz (University of Graz)



13. Keynes, Mathematics and the General Theory

Roger Backhouse (Univ. of Birmingham)


Blurbs




It is a basic truth in the history of economics that great ideas never die. They attain this permanence because they are shaped by both the internal demands of economic theorizing as well as the external realities of the economy. The Return to Keynes, edited by three distinguished scholars, testifies to this truth and demonstrates that doing the history of economics is a part of doing economics well. Keynesian macroeconomic policy as a tool for stabilization is now firmly fixed in the toolbox of economics.

― Prof. Yuichi Shionoya, Hitotsubashi University

This fascinating collection of papers addresses the current status and relevance of Keynes from a number of perspectives: the return of macroeconomic policy activism, the state of modern macroeconomics, the recent scholarship of Keynes's life and work, and some elements of Keynes's work that might be relevant to the current crisis. The authors' backgrounds are diverse and their scholarship often cutting edge. A fine guide to the present state of play.

― Prof. D.E. Moggridge, University of Toronto

During the 1990s, John Maynard Keynes, and Keynesian economics, were declared to be well and truly dead. Then came the financial and
economic crises of 2008 and they were reborn as a way of understanding economies with significant unemployment. This excellent collection of essays,brought together by three prominent scholars of Keynes and Keynesian policy, will be a convenient way for those who have forgotten Keynesian economics to refresh themselves, and for others to learn for the first time.
― Prof. Craufurd Goodwin, Duke University


Product Description

Keynesian economics, which proposed that the government could use monetary and fiscal policy to help the economy avoid the extremes of recession and inflation, held sway for thirty years after World War II. However, it was discredited after the stagflation of the 1970s, which not only proved resistant to traditional Keynesian policies but was actually thought to be caused by them. By the 1990s, the anti-Keynesian counter-revolution seemed to reach its pinnacle with the award of several Nobel Prizes in economics to its architects at the University of Chicago. However, with the collapse of the dot-com boom in 2000 and the attacks of 9/11 a year later, the nature of macroeconomic policy debate took a turn. The collapse prompted a major shift in macroeconomic policy, as the Bush administration and other governments around the world began to resort to Keynesian measures—both monetary and fiscal policies—to stabilize the economy. The Keynesian rebirth has been most dramatically illustrated during the past year when central banks have pumped billions of dollars of liquidity into the world’s financial system to address the crises of confidence, illiquidity, and insolvency that were triggered by the sub-prime lending crisis. The Return to Keynes puts Keynesian economics in a fresh perspective in order to assess this surprising new era in economic policy making.

   Book Reviews,


・George Peden, University of Stirling, UK, Economic History Review

 
・G. C. Harcourt, Australian School of Business

The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 18: 1, Feb. 2011, 159-164


・Geoff Tily, City University London

Economica, 80, No.317, 2013,
190-192,




2013/07/29

Exploring Hawtrey’s Social Philosophy* ― Through His Unpublished Book, Right Policy


 

 

 

 

 Exploring Hawtrey’s Social Philosophy*

  Through His Unpublished Book, Right Policy

 

   Toshiaki Hirai (Sophia University)

                                         

 

1. Introduction

 

Ralph Hawtrey (1879-1975) is well-known as an economist who developed a monetary theory of business cycles.1 He is also famous for providing a theoretical basis for the so-called “Treasury View”2 ― and thus as an economist who took a stand against Keynes. Moreover, he developed a critical approach to Keynes as the author of the Treatise.3 Leaving these relatively well-known aspects of Hawtry the economist to other occasions, We would like to focus here on his social philosophy now completely forgotten.4 

Hawtrey was brought up in the intellectual environment of Cambridge ― among other things, he was an apostle of the “Society”. After graduation he entered the Treasury and worked as “the only economist” there until retirement.  

In the field of social philosophy Hawtrey published two books: The Economic Problem [1926. Hereafter EP]5 and Economic Destiny [1944. Hereafter ED]. In this paper we will, rather, focus on his other and last (unpublished) book, Right Policy: the Place of Value Judgments in Politics (Hawtrey Papers, 12/2, Churchill College, Cambridge University. 528 pages type-written manuscript composed of eighteen chapters. Hereafter RP), although we will refer to the two books as need arises.

Right Policy is a book which critically examines the areas of economics, sociology and politics, being based on Moorean ethics - including “Good as indefinable”. As will be explained later, “value judgments” in the subtitle means judgments in view of “true ends” by a leader rather than “intermediate ends” by the public.

Before we enter into the main argument, it could be useful to introduce RP’s table of contents. It runs as follows. In Chapters I “Ends”, II “The Good” and III “The Philosophic Religion” discussion ranges over the ethical sphere, passing on, in Chapters IV “Government”, V “Freedom” and X “Class” to the political and sociological spheres, and in Chapter VI “Economic Fundamentals”, VIII “Labour” and IX “Questions of Distribution” to the world of economics. In Chapter VII “Capitalism and Collectivism” comparative systems are argued while Chapter XI “The Balance of Power” to XVII “A Concert of Great Powers” address international politics (Chapter XII “Colonies”, XIII “The War Problem”, XIV “Communism and Nationality”, XV “Power Politics and Ideology” and XVI “Conditions of Peaceful Coexistence”). The book closes with Chapter XVIII, “Conclusion”.

The main purpose of this paper is to explore and evaluate how Hawtrey’s social philosophy is constructed. The paper runs as follows: In section 2 we will present the main theme of Right Policy, and in section 3 we will consider “The Theory of Aspects” as Hawtrey’s own philosophy. In section 4 we will outline Moorean ethics, and go on to analyse in section 5 how Hawtrey saw society, and in section 6 how he saw the economy. In section 7 his theory of the world peace will be dealt with, and in section 8 how philosophy evolved in Cambridge after Moore. Section 9 will offer a brief comparison between Moore, Hawtrey and Keynes in philosophy and social philosophy. Section 10 is the conclusion.

When examining RP, we cannot help feeling that his way of developing his social philosophy is discursive and lacking in logical integration. What the present paper aims to do is to clarify his social philosophy, filling in the gaps. In this sense, it might be called an “exploration”.

The exploration is of a certain significance. Firstly, it will comprise an important part of the project, “Studies of the Social Philosophies” in the interwar Cambridge to see what sort of social philosophy one of the main economists developed. Secondly, discursiveness does not necessarily mean that Hawtrey’s social philosophy is of no significance. We would, rather, emphasize that Hawtrey made great efforts to construct his social philosophy in a more systematic way than his Cambridge contemporaries, including Keynes, Robertson and Pigou.

 

2. The Main Theme

 

2.1 Right Policy, True Ends and Good 

We need to clarify, first and foremost, what the main theme of Right Policy is. The title implies man’s behaviour not so much among individuals as in relation to a community.6 “Man” here indicates a “leader or ruler” (not the general public), with the emphasis on the obligation assumed by a leader. It is argued that a leader who is responsible for implementing public policy should differ from the general public, and base his/her behaviour on an evaluation of the Good7 without settling for “intermediate ends”, which are no more than means by which the people should make their living, and which might decline into “false ends”8 “[w]hen these intermediate ends are allowed to dominate action, without regard to qualifying circumstances or consequences” (RP, p.528).

As he sees it, the only end (ultimate aim) which Pure Reason should acknowledge is the Good.9 “Right” ends – an antonym of “intermediate ends” – which a leader should pursue must be good ones, so we need to understand what is meant by the “Good”.10 Hawtrey here follows Moore’s “Good as indefinable”11, which implies that it can be appreciated only intuitively by the mind. He lays the foundation of his social philosophy on it.

 

… in the last resort there is no substitute for the Good as the ultimate foundation of the moral code and of the principles of all human behaviour (RP, p.136).

 

Hawtrey then declares that one does not need to define “right ends” (therefore, “right policy”),12 for man is able to recognise right policy intuitively. The Good is argued to be “within the reach of the intelligence of all human beings” (RP, p.136), and to be objective. He states that, in order to identify the Good, man does not need to rely on philosophy but can appeal to everyday judgment.

 

We are not used to reflecting about the Good, and about the relation of means to ultimate ends, but our judgments involving it pervade all practical life, so that a moral code built on it has firm foundation (RP, p.136).

 

   … the Good is not merely Good for him. His experience is an experience for him, but the attribute good is inherent in the experience, and is not just relative to him …. What is good is good, and the individual who experiences it is merely the channel through which it is realised (RP, p.69c).

 

When he states that the “goodness” of Right Policy13 is indefinable (and yet he insists that the attribute “Good” is extensible to other states of feeling such as aesthetic pleasures, intellectual pleasures and “human values”14, which man can appreciate by way of intuition), we cannot help feeling that what “good” ends actually means is left to the readers’ judgment from the outset.

In the Preface to Right Policy, Hawtrey declares that the purpose of the book is to assist clear thinking about [political and social] problems by appealing to “a sense of value inherent in human consciousness”.

 

2.2 Hawtrey’s Conception of Society

  With his conception of society composed of a ruler and the public together with everyone’s assumed ability to identify the Good and the distinction between “true and intermediate ends" (to be examined later), Hawtrey seems to conceive society as follows:

 

  Any society is composed of a ruler and the public. Although all the individuals, by nature, have an ability of identifying the Good through intuition, only a ruler could pursue right policy based on the true ends, while the public, who will entrust authority to the ruler, are in a position to pursue intermediate ends. A ruler should, in turn, pursue right policy in such a way that it could satisfy the needs of the public, and take care lest intermediate ends should fall into false ends (The public are not in a position to pursue the Good, even if they have the ability of identifying the Good. That is why they would leave this task to a ruler).

 

  Society thus conceived has its foundations in the relation between ruler and public. It is worth noting that liberty is regarded as one of intermediate ends. The ultimate value is set on the Good, which should be pursued by the ruler. Here the Good has priority over liberty. And this concept of Good is attributable to Moore, so Moorean ethics have a fundamental role in Hawtrey’s social philosophy.

  We should also note that Hawtrey does not put forward any concrete policy in Right Policy. What he sets out to expound there is his social philosophy.

  We have already said more than enough for our initial remarks. Let us now go on to focus on a more precise topic --- his specific philosophy.

 

 

3. The Theory of Aspects

 

Hawtrey’s own philosophy might be called the “Theory of Aspects” (since his youth he had cherished “aspect” as a fundamental concept.15). Let us see how this theory is discussed in RP, pp.42-53, taking Thought and Things, his only, and unpublished philosophical book into consideration (Hawtrey Papers, 12/1, Churchill College, Cambridge University. A 314-page typescript composed of eight chapters. Hereafter TT).

The theory of aspects lies in the “analysis of thought into the discernment of aspects in conscious experience”. Using a method of “introspection”, it argues that mind can discern aspects. According to Hawtrey, aspects do in fact exist in things, but only as potentiality. They do not become reality until they are discerned, through conscious experience, by the mind.16 Suppose people see a certain picture. Some might discern “delicate beauty”, while others might see “delicate shadow”. Delicate beauty and delicate shadow are aspects which intrinsically exist in that picture, and are realized through each individual’s discernment.

Aspects are inseparable from a thing as a whole. Although “delicate beauty” exists in the picture, and is realized through discernment by mind, it cannot be isolated from the picture. Aspects thus obtained, according to him, are accumulated within the mind. Whenever it makes a judgment, the mind is to make reference to them.

In this theory, man’s mind is considered to have a certain, if not complete, ability to discern various aspects in a thing such as an aspect of sense experience, an aspect of feeling and sentiment, an aspect of thought and so forth.

Hawtrey’s own philosophy thus belongs to the stream of empiricism, standing between objectivism and subjectivism, laying its foundations on the individual’s ability to appreciate aspects, and is in sharp contrast with Behaviourism and Materialism, which attempt to explain things and phenomena as independent of mind. He is also critical of Scientism, which sets out to explain phenomena in terms of things.17 

How is the theory of aspects, which represents Hawtrey’s epistemology, related to the Good? Can the Good be said to exist as an aspect in things? Hawtrey seems to relate the theory to the Good, but he does not succeed in persuading us.

In order to be consistent with Moorean ethics, the Good must exist beyond all the aspects existing in things. Aspects seem to be considered to be important in relation to the appreciative ability of the mind. He believes that if one refines one’s capacity for discernment and perceives more artistic, and more delicate aspects through education, society will reach a higher level (for this will contribute to more “plus products” [to be explained below]). Therefore, we might reasonably conclude that the theory of aspects is argued in relation to the appreciative ability of mind, while the Good is esteemed as the ultimate, independent of aspects. And yet, be it noted, both are deemed to be intuitively appreciated.18

Now we will turn to Moorean ethics as the foundation of Hawtrey’s social philosophy.

 

 

4. Moorean Ethics

 

It is well known that Moore attracted the most excellent students of Cambridge in the early 20th century, who gathered in the “Society”.19 Hawtrey was not only one of them but also laid the foundations of Right Policy on Moorean ethics.20 No such persistence is to be seen among his contemporaries who were also influenced by Moore.

The Good cannot be defined, and can be grasped only through intuition ― “Good as indefinable”. It is this Good to which he attaches the highest importance.

 

   I think the world has most reason to be grateful for his emancipation of the attribute Good from the obscurities and dubieties of philosophy (RP, p.4).

 

  It is worth noting, again, that in RP liberty is regarded not as the ultimate but as one of intermediate ends. Although liberty is deemed a high ideal open to the human mind, which craves multiplicity and a vast range of opportunities, it is not, according to him, a true end.21

Let us turn to intermediate ends. Hawtrey states that “code of conduct or moral code” offers various intermediate ends as practical guidance, mentioning “honesty, good faith, kindness, respect for property, for the family, for authority, and for personal rights and feelings”22 as well as instinct and the “system of rewards and punishments”.23 He admits the indispensability of intermediate ends in the actual world, and yet warns that, when going to extremes, they might decline into “false ends”, mentioning as examples “the desire for material possessions” (in contrast with the moral aspiration which shares satisfaction)24, “the desire for money” (which injures other valuable feelings), “safety” (which might prompt the feeling that punishment to criminals is in itself desirable) and “egoism”.

Hawtrey argues that a leader should take heed of intermediate ends as an object of criticism.

 

[An existing moral code] can itself be only a code of intermediate ends. The existing code itself must be open to criticism, … No political principle is exempt from this criticism, not Justice, Liberty or Security (RP, p.72a).

 

  Hawtrey regards liberty, justice, security, democracy, and respect for property and personal rights as intermediate ends, distinguishable from true ends. He sets them below the Good, pursuit of which by a ruler should be regarded as the supreme priority. In this sense, he is not a liberal who puts the highest priority on liberty and respect for property. This type of ranking is peculiar to Hawtrey, there being no sign of it in the writings of Keynes, Robertson or Pigou. Indeed, it constitutes the most conspicuous feature of Hawtrey’s social philosophy, showing strong affinity with Plato’s ideal of the nation, although based on Moorean ethics.

  In The Economic Problem he had already defined “welfare” in relation to (probably Moore’s) Good, arguing that:

 

   Welfare here is an ethical term25; it comprises … those experiences, which are good in themselves …. It is co-extensive with the simple concept “good” as applied not to means, but to ends. We are speaking here of experiences which are good as ends or in themselves … The distinction [between “good as ends” and "good as means”] is familiar to philosophers, and is fundamental in ethics (EP, p.185).

 

 In The Economic Problem “welfare” was used as a key concept, while it is not adopted in Right Policy where the “Good” is the ultimate. In EP he argued “power” in relation to authority and obedience, but not in relation to the Good, whereas in RP he did so. In this respect RP might be seen as the book into which Hawtrey set out to incorporate Moore’s ethics as the foundation, and here the ruler appears as the important figure whose task it is to implement right policy.

 

 

5. Cognition of Society

    

     Let us now turn to how Hawtrey conceives of society. The key concepts here are “leader (ruler)”, the “theory of evolution” and “rationalisation".

 

5.1 Leader (Ruler)

Whenever he speaks of society, Hawtrey argues that there exists power in any society which is composed of a leader26 who possesses and uses power, and the public, who follow him/her. Among other things, he stresses the role of the leader (or the class of leaders27) as indispensable for maintaining society. Terms such as “authority” and “power” appear in connection with him/her. 

 

authority is conceded to the leader as ruler conditionally. The community becomes an instrument in his hands. The members of the community accord him loyalty and obedience on condition that he so uses this instrument as to further their individual ends (RP, p.21).

 

This is true of any type of society. In a democratic society, for example, the public, through elections, entrust power to the parliament, which is to give orders which the public accept as long as it does not deviate from the norms/conventions of society.

 

The aim of democracy is to supersede that right of rebellion, which is the only remedy of discontent against an autocratic or oligarchic government, by a system of control residing in the whole mass of people (RP, p.108).

 

The following passage expresses the essential of Hawtrey’s cognition of society.

 

    If association is to progress beyond an elementary stage, the members must have cognizance of the community itself. The community is a powerful instrument, which requires conscious direction in its handling (RP, p.20).

 

“Conscious direction” by the leader and the loyalty and obedience of the public, according to Hawtrey, open the way toward the rationalization of the society. He considers that a society lacking such a leader will tend to fall into confusion. A (good) leader, who should implement Right Policy based on the Good, is considered to be indispensable for rationalising any society.

  This cognition underlies his argument on collectivism (see Section 6 below), on the world as a whole (see Section 7 below) and on the market economy. Hawtrey holds that the market economy without any conscious direction could fall into chaos and needs some kind of planning by the State. He is acutely aware, moreover, that because power is unevenly distributed there, the market mechanism cannot guarantee the intrinsic value of goods (to be explained in Section 6).

In the early 20th century Elite Theories28 became prevalent, as represented by V. Pareto, G. Mosca and R. Michels. Although we cannot verify that Hawtrey was influenced by them, it appears quite probable. He emphasizes that there exists a moral code which the people conventionally observe, and without which the maintenance of order would be impossible. And a leader is also required to observe it to retain his/her position.

 

5.2 The Theory of Evolution and Rationalisation

Apart from Elite Theories, Hawtrey’s cognition of society also shows the influence of the Theory of Natural/Social Evolution. Although he was to accept Moore’s intuitive ethics, Hawtrey had adhered to the theory of evolution since his youth. 29

 The human mind was not a perfect instrument for thought and knowledge from the outset, but evolved under the pressure of natural selection, adapting to the circumstances. The human mind’s principal function here was to memorize impressions of physical circumstances, and to take appropriate action by way of an “instinctive propensity”.30 He then argues;

 

Mind, once fully developed, has opened the way to a far more rapid process of social evolution, in which instinctive reactions have been supplemented by conscious planning (RP, p.4).

 

The human being is, in fact, an entity in which rationality is added to the animal instincts.31

 

Human evolution is above all an evolution of consciousness. Consciousness itself has a high survival value. … When the progress of physiological evolution has equipped man with a brain capable of systematic thought, conscious planning becomes possible (RP, p.11).

 

The human mind has thus been developed through the process of natural and social evolution. Accordingly as it has been capable of developing systematic thinking, it has enabled to introduce “conscious planning” into society.

“Rationalisation” is the term used to explain the development of the human mind at this stage. It is a process which renders religious disciplines explainable by Reason. In this process mystical elements which the people had blindly worshipped are gradually to disappear while the area which the human mind can understand by way of Reason is to increase. Rationalisation32 is, in a word, a development of rational philosophy.

 

Mind, once evolved, is free to think of all things, including its own states of feeling. When these are judged desirable, and the mind discerns right means to right ends, the way is open to rational action (RP, p.69a).

 

        A rational act is directed to a purpose or end. Rationality requires the selection

of the right means to attain given ends, but it involves something more. The ends themselves must be right ends (RP, p.3).

 

    Accordingly as society evolves, the conscious mind evolves and human beings come to be aware of the problem of the “Good”. This is the situation in which Moorean ethics hold good: the human mind has acquired the ability to appreciate the Good through intuition.

 

    The search for an ethical criterion in evolution bears fruit because human society in this phase of evolution is awake to the good (RP, p.9).33

 

 

6. Cognition of Economy

 

In this section we will look into Chapters 6-10 of RP, the main theme of which is to “apply the ultimate criterion [of the Good] to economic problems”34. The most conspicuous feature in Hawtrey’s cognition of economy lies in his close attention to the “Good” as the ultimate end. In these chapters, among other things, “economic ends” and “economic justice” matter.35 Another point worth noting is “comparison between Capitalism and Collectivism”.

 

6.1 Economic Ends

The dominant feature of Hawtrey’s cognition of economy is a classification of final products into “utility products” and “plus products”.36 Utility products are indispensable for making livings, maintaining lives, and protecting the people from injury, pain or discomfort. Plus products are designed to afford some positive benefits or enjoyment.

Hawtrey argues that if economic activities were to make some positive contribution to the “true ends”, it should be sought in plus products. 37 He cautions, however, that the ends of the plus products should not be identified with the Good (for example, human values do not depend on plus products).

  Hawtrey always sees final products from these points of view, so “value judgments” in his sense are incessantly involved. He seeks to evaluate economic activities in relation to the Good as true ends, criticising Marshall-Pigou’s methodology in which the object of economic analysis should be confined to economic welfare. When he states that plus products could be useful for the “right ends”, he might have in mind the Theory of Aspects, which stresses the “aesthetic pleasure” or “intellectual pleasure” that the people can appreciate.

  Plus products have market value because they are transacted in the markets. The final products which exceed utility products, the plus products, are related to the economic activities serving to attain the Good. Hawtrey points out that the divergence between the intrinsic and market values of the plus products, however, should be very large (although he offers no answer to how the gap can be bridged).

 

The market value of a work which is destined eventually to be recognised as of transcendent merit, may thus be very low. And, even when recognition attributes a high cash value to such work, the cash value cannot be taken as a measure of its intrinsic merit. Cash value has very little bearing on the aesthetic or intellectual value of plus products (RP, p.159).38

 

Hawtrey also argues that whether economic activities can contribute to the attainment of the Good depends on how plus products can grow.

He also approaches education from this point of view.

 

  … the aim of education should be to extend to all people the sense of values, the power of appreciation, appropriate to a governing class .… a sense of values, that is to say, of right ends (RP, p.303).

 

   … much of education may be treated, like care of health, as a utility product.… As soon as education proceeds beyond these limits, the plus aspect begins to predominate. When education inculcates good manners and sound morals, it prepares the way for human values, and, when it develops literary, artistic and scientific tastes, it opens up the appreciation of the higher levels of plus products (RP, pp.290-291).

 

And yet Hawtrey’s treatment of plus products seems somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the intrinsic values of plus products are argued to lie in artistry, so they depend on the public who have the ability of appreciation. On the other hand, plus products are transacted in the markets, and are sold and bought with cash. There should, indeed, lie a great divergence between their intrinsic values and their market values.

However, the gap would remain hard to bridge even if the public’s capacity for appreciation were improved, for there are plus products in which intrinsic (aethetic) values would have no relation to the market (cash) values. Hawtrey seems to overlook the market transaction in the actual economy by paying too much attention to viewing the aesthetic aspects of plus products in relation to the “right ends”.

In “The Demand for Plus Products” (RP, pp.274-278a), Hawtrey argues that plus products differ from one another according to differences in the method of marketing. Here he points out that in industrial society the middle class has taken over affluent patrons who were influential in aristocratic society. He seems to perceive the demand for plus products in the industrial society in a pessimistic way, and describe it rather ambiguously.

Hawtrey argues that in the market economy the function and ability of dealers outweigh those of the other economic agents. Among other things, the role of dealers in selling is emphasized. The market organization is “composed of … dealers in commodities who specialize in buying and selling and are ready to deal with all comers”(RP, p.180), and “[t]he making of a price which equates supply and demand is an important part of the services rendered by the dealers in a market, but by no means the whole” (RP, p.181). In contrast, the consumers are lacking in ability and information.39 There is, therefore, a certain difference in ability among economic agents.

This point is worth noting, and yet it does not imply that the dealers can settle the above-mentioned divergence. Even if consumers were able to level up their capacities for appreciating plus products, the possibility of contributing to decreasing the divergence would probably be slight in view of the definition of intrinsic value.

The development of the capitalistic economy has brought about products far beyond the products necessary for survival --- electrical goods, medicines, automobiles and so forth. However, they are not plus products, for these durable goods are regarded as utility products.40 Innovative industrial technology has gone into producing these goods, vastly improving the degree of convenience in everyday life. It is the profitability in the markets, however, that finally governed the growth of these products, and profitability largely depends on the degree of increasing returns to scale. Actually, it seems farfetched to evaluate the market economy from a point of view of plus products, relating intrinsic value to right ends.

 

6.2 Economic Justice

“Economic justice” (as well as justice in general) is an intermediate end (so that taking it to an extreme could make it fall into “false ends”)41 and is a part of moral code. When applied to the social system, however, economic justice becomes a moral obligation for a leader.42

 

   Economic justice requires that there be no arbitrary discrimination among persons in the distribution of resources, but it also requires that the rules governing distribution be good rules (RP, p.172).

 

Hawtrey describes two types of distribution system a system of rewards and a system according to needs.43 The former is a system adopted in the capitalistic society in which the equivalent to what an individual produces belongs to him/her, while the latter is a system taken as ideal in the communist society.44

Economic justice, according to Hawtrey, is required as a compromise between the two systems. On the one hand, justice is a concept which prohibits arbitrary inequality in treating individuals.

 

[Justice] must be so understood that what is just is right. The rules to be conformed to must be good rules (RP, p.169).

 

Therefore, a leader must render social services through distribution “according to needs” to those who cannot meet their needs on their own.

On the other hand, if justice in a system of rewards should be taken into consideration, then the expectations it prompts should not be betrayed. This, too, is a moral obligation that a ruler must observe.45 

  Thus, when social services are to be provided it is far from clear where the concept of justice should be situated between the two systems of distribution. Hawtrey then concludes:

 

Distribution according to needs provides a certain standard for those who for any good reason cannot secure it by their own earning power, and the rest of the available output is distributed in the forms of the equivalent of each person’s contribution to it, subject to the appropriate deduction of taxation (RP, pp.172-173). 

 

Economic justice is, again, an intermediate end, not a true end. Hawtrey discusses economic justice not in terms of “commutative justice”/ “distributive justice” but in terms of a system of rewards/ a system based on needs. Economic justice is needed as what is good as a “rule”, not as an end itself. Hawtrey holds that only a compromise could satisfy the public as a whole.

 

6.3 Capitalism and Collectivism

How did Hawtrey evaluate Capitalism and Collectivism46, the latter prohibiting private firms and providing for collective ownership? 47 The following sum up his judgement.

 

(1) Economic adjustment by means of monetary policy is easier in Collectivism than in Capitalism. Because in the latter the government can make only indirect adjustment to the movement of the credit economy, it has some difficulty of maintaining balance as if on the razor. Contrastingly, Collectivism eschews this difficulty.48

   

In passing, the objective of monetary policy is identified as price stability. Hawtrey’s description here reminds us of something like the quantity theory of money.

  

 (2) In Collectivism a wave of innovative firms are difficult to take place due to the nature of the system which depends on bureaucratic machinery.49 Contrastingly, because in Capitalism what to produce is left to entrepreneurs, the possibility of innovation is far higher.

 

In Collectivism accountability to the authority tends to be a formidable bottleneck. Even if high officials sought the advice of specialists, they would still see innovation as a potentially dangerous deviation from the familiar routine.

 

 (3) Capitalism could come close to Collectivism by, through progressive tax, correcting inequality which this system has (inequality, which is derived from profit and land ownership).

 

To sum up, Collectivism excels in (1), while Capitalism in (2). As for (3), Capitalism can come close to Collectivism.

So which side will Hawtrey stand on?  Although he makes no final judgement in Right Policy, we may point out that he shifts toward the right in terms of the political spectrum as compared with his position in The Economic Problem and Economic Destiny.

At the same time we must point out just how critically Hawtrey saw Capitalistic society. He was keenly aware how difficult it is for the market system to bridge the gap between intrinsic value and market value: for (i) levelling up the public’s capacity for appreciation has some limitations; (ii) the market has some bias in power between dealers and consumers, and (iii) there are certain malfunctions in the labour market. Moreover, Capitalistic society is motivated by false ends (profit making), as a result of which it reveals inequality in income distribution. In short, Capitalistic society is a Plutocracy. One remedy for correcting plutocracy might be an intervention of the State (or a Ruler). However, Hawtrey must have considered that any type of society faces intractable difficulties in attaining “intrinsic value”. 

 

 

7Views on World Peace

 

In Right Policy no few pages are used for the political situation of the world. Among other things, much reference is made to the Cold War, the Suez Crisis and the Korean War. There Hawtrey was acutely aware of the weak and awkward position of the United Nations.

Whenever Hawtrey looks out to the world, the “balance of power” (among independent nations) 50 is a key concept. Again, for him power exists in every society: every nation possesses power, being always a potential enemy to the rest of the nations.51 The world is also regarded as a society in which there exist a ruler and the ruled.

A world consisting only of independent nations is situated in a kind of “international anarchy”52 in the sense of Dickinson53, in which it cannot keep peace. Hawtrey suggests, as a way of escaping from this situation, peaceful co-existence by means of “the genuine co-operation of the great powers”.54

 

Co-operation by the great powers means co-operation in the application of principles which will take the place of war in adapting the international system to changing conditions. It is these principles that they must agree upon if war is no longer to be an institution (RP, p.467). 

 

“War” is, according to Hawtrey, an “institution”55 which has so far played an essential role in the adaptation of society to changes, and is an act negating pursuit of the Good.56 His hopes was put on revitalizing and resuscitating the United Nations as a means of attaining world peace.

 

   Once the requisite agreement and co-operation [among the Great Powers] have been assured, the United Nations Organisation will be at hand to provide the instrument of action, and the world will not want to incur delay in using it by waiting for the elaboration of a constitution (RP, p.466).

 

 

8. Philosophical Development in Cambridge57

 

We have so far examined Hawtreys’s social philosophy through Right Policy. However, we must not forget that interwar Cambridge saw philosophical torrents that were to revolutionise not only Cambridge but also the world. How did Hawtrey respond to these torrents? That is the question we would address in this section. It goes a long way toward understanding Hawtrey to see him in the wider context, and to compare him with his contemporaries. 

The starting point can be found in Moorean ethics, the most conspicuous feature of which lies, again, in “the Good as indefinable”. Arguing that the Good cannot be defined, and that attempts to define it in terms of other concepts would fall into naturalistic error, Moore delivered a heavy blow against the established ethics: The Good is the Good; one can neither replace it with other words nor decompose it. How can one discern the Good, then? Moore’s answer was through “intuition”. All men/women are equipped with it, Moore insisted.

Moore’s view was to have a profound impact. We saw that Hawtrey cherished this view throughout his life. Keynes was also greatly influenced by it on the way to A Treatise on Probability [1921], which can be traced back to criticism of Moore’s “Ethics in relation to Conduct” in Principia Ethica. Moreover, “probability” in the Treatise defined as “the degree of rational belief among propositions” is itself Moorean, for this “degree” is argued to be obtainable only through intuition. Here the epistemology of “Good as indefinable” is applied to “probability”. It is also well-known that Moorean ethics had a profound impact on the members of the “Society”, and/or those of the “Bloomsbury Group” (Lytton Strachey, Leonard Woolf and so forth). Moorean ethics features intuitionism, objectivism, and cognitivism in regarding the Good as a fact.

This does not mean, however, that Moorrean ethics was not criticized. Far from it, it provoked criticism from the outset. The so-called “Emotivism” of Ogden, Richards, Stevenson and others is a representative example, which was to become dominant  meta-ethics in the 1920s-1950s. It argued that the Good is useful only as an emotional sign expressing one’s attitude (see Davis, p.45) and should be understood as individualistic. It also criticised the objectivism of Moorean ethics on the ground that it failed to take into account the fact that intuitive understanding of the Good was prone to error. Emotivism was to go hand in hand with Logical Positivism which has Verificationism as its motto.

Another strand of criticism of Moorean ethics can be found in the later Wittgenstein, who developed the theory of language game, and the later Keynes, who is considered to succeed the later Wittgenstein. It should be noted here that Ramsey, together with Sraffa, made some contribution to the birth of the later Wittgenstein.58

  The story does not stop here. We have, again, Ramsey. Harshly criticising A Treatise on Probability in “Truth and Probability” (Ramsey [1926]), he put forward an alternative theory now known as the theory of subjective probability, which was to lead to the decision-making theory (Ramsey was here influenced by Pierce’s pragmatism and J.S. Mill’s utilitarian psychology).

 

  Hawtrey found himself amidst this outpouring torrents: he was a member of the “Society” and the Bloomsbury Group, took a keen interest in philosophy and that wrote an unpublished philosophical book, Thought and Things. How did he react to these torrents, then?

  My provisional answer is that he did not change his philosophical stance. This is demonstrable from Right Policy, which this paper has so far examined, as well as Thought and Things. Hawtrey held on to Moorean ethics based on “Good as indefinable” and his own “Theory of Aspects” throughout his life. In this respect he differs from Keynes, who was once enthusiastic about Moorean ethics, but came to take a critical view of it later on.59

 

 

9. Comparison with Moore and Keynes

 

Now that we have examined Right Policy, let us compare Hawtrey with Moore and Keynes. Moore was a key figure who influenced Keynes’s way of thinking as well as Hawtrey’s. Hawtrey, in turn, had some influence on Keynes as an economist. All three were outstanding figures of Cambridge in philosophy and/or economics. 

 

9.1 Comparison with Moore in Philosophy

Hawtrey’s philosophy has four essentials: (i) the theory of evolution; (ii) the theory of aspects; (iii) Moorean ethics; (iv) the distinction between true ends and intermediate ends.

  (i) and (ii) are peculiar to Hawtrey. He argues that the human mind has made progress in terms of theory (i). “Rationalisation” is a key word there. Suppose that the human mind has reached the stage of completion through rationalisation. Then Hawtrey’s epistemology (ii) comes in (different from Moorean theory of “sense data”). Hawtrey cherished (i) and (ii) since his youth.

  (iii) and (iv) are, by contrast, elements which Hawtrey succeeded from Moore and regarded as essential in philosophy.

  To sum up, we can say that Hawtrey was not completely imbued with Moore’s philosophical influences, but rather maintained/developed his own philosophical stance.

 

9.2 Comparison with Keynes in Philosophy

We have now seen, albeit partially, what Hawtrey’s philosophy was like. What of Keynes’s philosophy?

  It can be divided into two phases. The first is represented by A Treatise on Probability. This should be regarded as “ethics of rational mind”. Probability, defined there as a degree of rational belief between propositions, is treated as objective and attainable through intuition (this is Moorean). Based on it, Keynes set out to explore the area between impossibility and certainty and construct an epistemological world by applying Russellian formal logic to it. He also endeavoured to explain induction in terms of formal logic. All in all, Keynes in this phase trusted the rationality of the human nature.

  With regard to Moore, Keynes accepted “Good as indefinable”, intuitionism, while he rejected Moore’s “moral” code which includes Utilitarianism (but it should not be forgotten that this rejection was to lead to his Probability).

  As the years went by, however, Keynes came to lose his trust on the rationality of the human nature. This is the second phase, starting around 1914. In 1938 he completely lost this trust, and came to emphasize custom and convention, believing that rationalism and individualism were flawed. We can ascertain his change in philosophy through “My Early Beliefs” read at the Memoir Club.

 

9.3 Comparison with Keynes in Social Philosophy

Keynes is also known as an advocate of “New Liberalism” in the mid-1920s. He severely criticised both the capitalistic system (on the ground that it was driven by motives of “pseudo-morality”) and laissez-faire economics and philosophy.

  Hawtrey stands on the same side with Keynes on these points (see note 46). He is also critical of the capitalistic system in terms of the divergence between intrinsic value and market value. It should be noted that Hawtrey regards liberty as an “intermediate end”, placing top priority on the Good.

Keynes welcomed the growth of semi-autonomous bodies lying between firms and the state, and the socialisation of large joint-stock companies within the then capitalistic system, playing down the role of entrepreneurs. Albeit he also supported Commons’s evolutionary theory of society, he seldom referred to it.

  Hawtrey endorses conscious planning as coming about due to evolution in rationalization, and the role played by the state, for example, in relation to economic justice.

  Keynes sought to correct Capitalism rather than abolish it. In contrast, Hawtrey’s position in Right Policy is not so clear. Although he is very critical of Capitalism and is seldom critical of Collectivism, he does not explicitly show which system is better (in The Economic Problem and Economic Destiny he supported Collectivism. See note 46).

  With regard to the international scene, Keynes took imperialism for granted, while Hawtrey was very critical of it as a false end.

  As for social philosophy, Hawtrey made great efforts to construct his own, laying the foundations on Moorean Good, and integrating other components such as a theory of aspects, the theory of evolution and an elite theory. He also insisted on the inseparability of economics from ethics. In the case of Keynes, we are left with the impression that he did not develop his own social philosophy in full

 

 

 

 

10. Conclusion

 

Hawtrey is the only scholar in interwar Cambridge to set out to systematically develop a social philosophy. His well-known monetary theory of business cycles occupies only a part of it.

What he aimed at was to construct a systematic theory to grasp human society. To this end, Moore’s Good was set as its foundation (On this point, Hawtrey occupies a unique position). The “true ends” are related to Moore’s Good. A leader should exclusively pursue them, while the public should live their everyday life, pursuing “intermediate ends”.

Although it is impossible to define Right Policy, we can appreciate what is good as ends through intuition. What matters for the implementation of Right Policy based on the Good is the human mind’s ability to discern Rightness (Goodness) intuitively. Hawtrey explains, in terms of rationalisation, that human beings have come to possess this ability. A leader should also check “intermediate ends” lest they should fall into “false ends”. In this respect, Right Policy is, par excellence, a philosophical/ ethical problem entailing value judgments from a point of view of “true ends”.

 

 

 

 

Notes

 

* An English version of Hirai [2009]. It is greatly revised, thanks to invaluable comments, among others, by Profs. T. Hashimoto (Hokkaido Univ.) and N. Yamawaki (Univ. of Tokyo) at the JSHET Conference (Keio Univ. May 2009), N. Aslanbeigui (Monmouth Univ., US) and J. Davis (University of Amsterdam [Netherlands] and Marquette University [US]) at the HES Conference (Univ. of Colorado Denver. June 2009), and R. Backhouse (Birmingham Univ.) and R. Sandilands (Univ. of Strathclyde, UK) at the UK-HET Conference (Univ. of Manchester. September 2009). Any possible errors are mine.

 

 

 1) Hawtery [1913] is his major work.

2) He developed it in Hawtrey [1925].

  3) He developed it in Hawtrey [1932]. The criticism developed here is based on Hawtery [1928] and anticipated the argument to be found in the General Theory (this point is virtually neglected even now). See Hirai [2003], pp.334-336.

 4) The only book so far published on Hawtrey is Deutscher [1990]. It does not deal

 with his social philosophy but his contribution to macroeconomics. I retrieved

 EBSCO at Sophia Univ. without any result in terms of articles on Hawtrey as a

 social philosopher.

 5) Hirai [2007] examines this.

 6) See RP, p.1. 

7) See RP, p.72. This view of the nation reminds us of Plato’s “Ideal Nation” in which a philosopher-king, who can appreciate the true world, rules over the people, who are specialized in their jobs.

8) Similar views are argued in details as “Welfare and the False Ends” in EP, pp.185, 314, and ED, Ch.12. The term “welfare” is used there in Hawtrey’s sense and might be interpreted as “true ends”.

9) See RP, p.69d.

10) See RP, p.3.

11) See RP, p.4.

12) See RP, p.4.

13) The same is true of “welfare” in EP. It is an ethical term which itself includes good experience, and is considered to be co-existent with the Good. See note 8 above.

14) See RP, pp.54-55.

15) See, for example, Hawtrey [1912], read at the “Friday Club”. TT originates from it (The title of Ch. 1 is “Aspects”). Hawtrey states that his “aspect” comes close to Langer’s “form”. See TT, p.52.

16) This might be related to Putnam’s “immanent realism”. “In Putnam [1987], Putnam self-criticised scientific realism and functionalism of the mind as his own stance, and came to defend pragmatism which interprets the reality of various objects in the outer world as closely linked with the cognitive subject’s interest and meaning, vehemently criticizing Scientism as holding that the truth is no more than a scientific truth” (Ito [1997], p.330. Translation is mine).

17) See TT, pp.241-243, where Hawtrey discusses the fundamental difference between “the area of consciousness” (Hawtrey’s stance) and “the area of mechanical causality” (the stance of Behaviourism and Materialism).

18) It should be noted that Hawtrey’s epistemology differs from Moore’s. In the case of Moore, there exist the so-called “sense data” between things and the mind. The mind appreciates things, through sense, in the form of sense data. Russell [1912] owes the core of his epistemology to Moore’s sense data (see “Sense-Data” [1910. In Baldwin ed. [1993]]). It is worth noting that the above-mentioned Hawtrey’s “aspect” pertains to the same period. In passing, in later years Russell expressed the view that both mind and material should be treated as a series of events in “Mind and Material” (see Russell [1956], p. 170).

19) For example, see Russell [1956], pp.79-80 and Russell, Woolf et. al. [1959].

20) See RP, p.4; TT, pp.100-105.

21) See RP, p.71.

22) See RP, p.37.

23) See RP, p.69d.

24) See RP, p.70.

25) Hawtrey criticised Pigou’s Economics of Welfare, arguing that it confines welfare to economic welfare (see Hawtrey[1926], pp.184-185. Pigou’s rejoinder to this is seen in Pigou [1950], p.17, fn.3). The stance taken by Hawtrey and Hobson was welcomed by Tokuzo Fukuda, a leading economist in pre-war Japan. This is attributable to his distinction between “economics of price” and “economics of welfare” (see Fukuda [1922], p.169).

26) Hawtrey compares a ruler to a gardener. See RP, p.62.

27) See RP, p.100.

28) For example, see Iyasu [2002] and Shionoya [1995], pp.208-211.

29) Hawtrey recollects that in his youth he argued, in Moore’s class, aesthetic and literary values from a point of view of the survival of the fittest theory (see TT, p.96).

30) See RP, p.4.

31) See RP, p.9.

32) Interestingly, Hawtrey defines civilisation in terms of rationalisation. “Civilisation is by no means to be understood as something wholly good. It can be nearly identified with the process of rationalisation of codes of behaviour. A nation is civilised in so far as it has the capacity of modelling and adapting its institutions and practices in accordance with deliberately planned means directed to conscious ends. Civilization so defined is not an unmixed good, for the ends may be good or bad” (RP, p.314).

33) Hayek also discusses the formation of Spontaneous Order (or “Rule”) in connection with the theory of evolution. However, “rule” is here deemed to be accomplished as the consequence of the people’s unintentional behaviours rather than the consequence of either an increase in rational cognizance or evolution in consciousness. Therefore, both scholars differently use the concept of evolution. Cf. RP, p.180. On my view on Hayek’s theory of Spontaneous Order, see Hirai [2000], pp.299-301.

34) It is explicitly described in the Preface of RP.

35) See RP, p.153b.

36) In EP, the products were classified into “defence products” and “creative products”, while in ED into “utility products” and “creative products”. In RP “creative products” are renamed “plus products”.

37) See RP, p.157.

38) In EP Hawtrey criticised an individualistic system (= capitalistic system) from a point of view of ethical value (=welfare in Hawtrey’ sense). He there expressed the view that due to the weak power of appreciation of human mind, the market value as determined in the goods market deviates from its ethical value.

39) See RP, p.216. His view referred to in the paragraph concerned is well-known. 

40) See RP, p.277.

41) See RP, p.172.

42) See RP, p.172.

43) See RP, p.168.

44) See RP, p.211.

45) See RP, p.170.

 46) See EP, pp.337, 390, 379 and ED, p.358. In EP Hawtrey points out that in an individualistic system (Capitalism) the activities of firms are motivated by making profits, as a result of which capital is accumulated and excessive inequality of income distribution emerges. The route cause ultimately lies in profit making, so that it is indispensable, through the attainment of true ends, to abolish it. Thus Hawtrey aims at having a system which is not founded on profit making, abolishing money making (Plutocracy) as “false ends” and establishing welfare as the true ends by means of the state as its centre ― in a word, Collectivism. In passing, the paper which Hawtrey read prior to 1914 at Morley College, an institute for adult education in London (Hawtrey Papers, 6/5/2) starts with the sentence: “In theory at any rate Socialism is the natural sequel of democracy…”.

  47) See RP, p.197.

48) See RP, p.250. It should be noted that Hawtrey earned a good reputation as an economist who developed a monetary theory of business cycles.

49) See RP, p.219.

50) In EP, Hawtrey paid attention to “power” besides money making. Among other things, this concept is used as a key concept for understanding the international scenes. Competition among nations for “interposts”, competition for colonies, and conquest activities, through fixation on “national powers”, paved the way to war. Such activities have been involved, linking “pursuit of power” with “Plutocracy”. Hawtrey made a remark that through fixation on “pursuit for power” and “Plutocracy”, these activities came to be regarded as true ends although they are, in fact, “false ends”. In RP, Hawtrey argues that we must change our way of thinking about adhering to “pursuit for power” and “Plutocracy”, turning the present peace, which is a potential state of war, into “the genuine peace”.

51) See RP, p.495.

52) In ED, Ch.10 (“International Anarchy and the United Nations”), “international anarchy” is mentioned as the largest factor for the economic confusion in the interwar period.

53) R. Fry was Dickinson’s closest friend, and “his sympathy was all directed toward Lowes Dickinson who fought to set up the League of Nations” (Woolf, V. [1940], p.272).

54) See RP, p.522.

55) See RP, p.357.

56) See RP, p.351.

57) The following owes to Davis [1994]. For emotivism, see Wikipedia (English Version) as well.

58) This does not mean that their views converged. Their standpoints rather seem to have generated harsh tension and antinomy. For the philosophical tension with Sraffa, see Kurz [2009].

59) This kind of persistence is also true of his stance in economics.

 

 

 

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