Keynes and the Postwar World Order Planning

                               

       

Keynes and the Postwar World Order Planning

– Internationalism, the British Empire Interests and Pragmatism

Toshiaki Hirai

Sophia University, Tokyo

                       

1. Introduction

Keynes revealed three aspects in his activities for the postwar world order planning in the 1940s – internationalist as a planner, pragmatist during the negotiations, and a defender of the British Empire interests. Keynes as an international system designer worked out proposals, which showed excellence of “internationalism” while he revealed himself, in the process of negotiations, as a sort of political pragmatist for the interests of the British Empire. We would verify this point mainly through commodity plans, rescue (and reconstruction) plans, and international monetary system, based on my three papers.*

(Evaluation of his creative plans and their present significance, which is another theme of this project and is dealt with in the three papers, is to be reported on another occasion).

 2.  Commodity Control Scheme

Keynes’s activities of primary commodities can be seen from two points of view; (1) the significance of a buffer stock plan in Keynes’s economic thought, and (2) how and why the plan was to be transmuted in the changing political situation.

(1)  Keynes firmly believed that violent fluctuations in the prices of primary products were attributable to the fatal defect that the competitive system abhors buffer stocks, and that in order to stabilize prices (and guarantee some living standard to producers) an international organization should be set up.

The Fifth Draft (“The International Control of Raw Materials” [April 1942]), the main emphasis of which was put on the price stabilization through buffer stock management, almost putting aside production restriction, ideally epitomizes his stance. It was filled with internationalism and is firmly grounded in his social philosophy ─ the New Liberalism, manifested since the mid-1920s.

   

<Central idea of the Fifth Draft>

In order to attain the above-mentioned goal, international buffer stock organizations, called Commod Controls, are proposed here, through which (price) stabilization policy should be implemented to redress the shortcomings of the competitive market system.

      Each Commod Control, which deals with an individual commodity, is to be composed of representatives of the major producing and consuming countries while its management is to be entrusted to independent specialists.

     The central function of the Commod Control is to stabilize the price of the commodity concerned (therefore to stabilize producers’ incomes) through buffer stock management. This is the crux of the plan, and to this end each Commod Control has the following tasks, among others: (i) fixing the basic price, (ii) management of stocks.

(2) However, the buffer stock plan made a series of transformation due to political concessions and compromises. Keynes went on revising his commodity control plan due to criticism from various governmental departments.

　(i) What is clear is that Keynes's plan has receded further and further as he

revised it.

The essential transmutation is that in the drafts following the Fifth Draft restriction on output was increasingly emphasized. The Sixth Draft (“The International Regulation of Primary Products” [May 1942]) came to incorporate Restrictive Plan in disguise, while the Eighth Draft came to include various kinds of Commod Controls, which works for several regulations, so that the original function, which Commod Control was intended to play not only in the Fifth Draft but also in the Sixth and Seventh ones (the same title [August 1942]), completely disappeared. The Eight Draft (the same title [February 1943]) has no clear-cut objective due to this change.

   

(ii) The Fifth Draft and the Sixth Draft were criticized by Leith-Ross (British representative for the negotiation), the Bank of England, and Fergusson (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries), who argued that it is filled with laissez-faire, and asked for restriction of production, while Harrod (and probably, Robbins and Mead) supported the Fifth Draft in earnest, criticizing the Sixth Draft.

Keynes, who wrote the Sixth Draft, giving Leith-Ross a “fair show”, responded to Harrod's criticism, saying that it maintains “the general atmosphere of approach of [the Fifth Draft]”.

We cannot find any document or letter to show Keynes’s dissatisfaction with  this transformation. Keynes seems to recognize that the following drafts have not been in contradiction, in spirit, with the Fifth Draft. He seems not to have expressed some anger or complaint against those who vehemently supported restriction of production.

We can see Keynes work as a sort of political pragmatist among political

interests, to such a degree that he lost the basic stance envisaged in the Fifth Draft.

(It should be noted here that this happened not so much in the international scene as in the domestic one.)

 

 (iii) The destiny of the international regulation plan for primary commodities runs as follows.

        In May 1943 the Eighth Draft was accepted by the War Cabinet. In the Anglo-American Conference on Postwar Economic Problems in September, the official document of the Eighth Draft was handed over to the United States.

The American side was negative toward a buffer stock article. Even on the British side, moreover, severe opposition was put up from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Bank of England, and the need for a commodity-by-commodity approach was advocated.

        

Thereafter the commodity problem took the form of a proposal to the Conference on Trade and Employment in Washington in autumn 1945. On the whole this proposal represented a position against the idea of buffer stocks, and included articles of commodity agreement among governments.        

The final result was a survival of the commodity agreement articles in the GATT and the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations.

           3. Relief and Reconstruction Problem

One might indeed ask: to what extent was Keynes a nationalist, an internationalist, and an imperialist? This is no simple question, and to some extent it has to do with the position of the UK in world politics. For a British citizen, loving the nation meant being a nationalist, an internationalist and an imperialist.

It might, however, be inappropriate to take Keynes in these terms. In the case of the relief and reconstruction problem he made great efforts towards relief and reconstruction of the post-war world, drawing up an elaborate design, while also seeking to keep the British Empire’s position in world politics  ─ somehow or other ─ on an equal footing with the US, under the disadvantageous circumstances that the British Empire desperately needed financial and military support from the US. He labored over international plans in a spirit of internationalism as far as possible, but sought in any case to defend the British Empire from the colossal powers of the US.

(1) In October 1941 Keynes put forward the Central Relief and Reconstruction Fund (CRRF) Plan filled with internationalism (“Treasury Memorandum on Financial Framework of Post-war European Relief”. When he first put forward the CRRF Plan, there was manifestly broad agreement between himself, Leith-Ross, and the U.S. Government.

   <Central idea of the CRRP>

The central idea here was that the CRRF should operate a joint fund comprised of money donations or contributions in kind from many countries. The CRRF should be responsible for collecting and distributing all required relief materials (it should be authorized to buy the commodities required at fair prices from any country). It should determine, on the basis of some appropriate principle, the proportion of the relief materials which a country should receive gratis or should be liable to pay.

    All transactions were to be booked in the joint fund. To allow the CRRF to estimate the scale of transactions, the following conditions were proposed: the CRRF should request allied governments to produce lists of their requirements; it should make estimates of the quantities of commodities available to it; it should investigate the financial position of each of the countries concerned, knowledge of which would be prerequisite for equitably determining the proportions in which assistance should be granted free of charge or made payable.

 Keynes considered the CRRF, conceived as above, greatly superior to the idea of having various countries giving relief in kind separately, and sincerely wished to see it set up. He argued that establishing the CRRF would obviate the need for making separate financial arrangements for each commodity, whilst the alternative idea would result in the distribution of commodities becoming a messy affair, due to the absence of any necessary correspondence between the commodity quantities available and an appropriate financial burden.

(2) However, Keynes changed his stance several times in response to the changing circumstances in which the British Empire found itself.

Around February 1942, Keynes’s thinking altered considerably. He now perceived the necessity of a change of tack, foreseeing that Britain’s post-war balance of trade situation would be likely to be grim, and Britain would be unable to make the contributions required by the CRRF Plan without borrowing from abroad.

For this reason he abandoned the CRRF Plan in favor of a pragmatic effort to try to get the (existing) Lend-Lease continued. Faced with the grim reality of the situation in which Britain found herself, Keynes responded in a way revealing the weight of the British interests, one consequence of which was confrontation with Leith-Ross.

Keynes’s next move was to put forward a compromise plan “Finance of Post-war Relief” (January 1943) which maintained the pragmatic approach to Lend-Lease whilst also retaining a degree of internationalism in the form of the role assigned to the Combined Boards. This, after some revision, became the official plan of the Treasury.

(3) From around the end of 1943 on, however, the relief issue was to be placed and addressed under the leadership of Harry White of the United States. In the final stage he was able to do little more than criticize the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Administration) from the sidelines.

(4) Our documentation reveals that Keynes tried to work out international plans, if possible, on a spirit of internationalism, but if not, to defend the British Empire from the US by means of sophisticated devices. In that sense Keynes was a designer for the international order as well as a defender of the British Empire.

(5) The following is what occurred after Keynes’s death and an ‘if’ story.

 In the end, it was under the Marshall Plan (the “European Recovery Program”), which took effect in 1948, that relief (and reconstruction) was carried out. Loans were systematically allocated by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) of the U.S. through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In the US-occupied territories, GARIOA-EROA was set up on the basis of American loans.

Roused from complacency by the onset of the Cold War, the U.S., which even in the immediate post-war period had been extremely reluctant to get involved in European affairs, became ─ well aware of the role it was taking on ─ the leader of the West in the new international order from 1949 on. The world in which Britain, now suffering from a hugely adverse balance of payments and massive war debts, could have assumed leadership was no more. It was, in fact, Britain that was to receive the largest share of the Marshall Plan.

How would Keynes have acted if he had lived long enough to see the development of the Marshall Plan? In a word, the Marshall Plan, which made a great contribution to the path leading up to the EU, might be regarded as an amalgamation of Keynes’s ideas expressed in his Economic Consequences of the Peace and the CRRF plan. He would probably have endorsed the Marshall Plan, the principal architects of which were Clayton and Acheson; they were on good terms with Keynes, and led the planning and management of OEEC (remember that it was Bevin, Foreign Secretary of the Attlee Government, UK, who led the initiative on the European side). This seems clear enough.

What remains uncertain, however, is how he would have dealt with the other aspect – the position of the UK in the power politics of the world. To what extent would he have reacted to the elements recognizable in the Marshall Plan ― scant or no consideration for the UK as the British Empire? Taking the subsequent story – the deteriorating situation of the UK, the emergence of the two hegemons (USA and USSR), the Suez Crisis – into account, he could not have done anything to save the British Empire from the disintegration to be seen during the Macmillan Government. Confronting this situation together with de Gaulle’s opposition to UK participation in the EEC, how would he have felt and acted? The question is destined to remain unanswered.  

                     4. International Monetary System

How did Keynes reveal the three aspects, which appeared in his activities for the commodity problem and the relief problem, in the sphere of international monetary system? To what degree are these three facets recognizable?

  Our research here comes to the same evaluation. Keynes as a system designer worked outdevised proposals, which showed excellence in terms of “internationalism”. However, he revealed himself,in the process of negotiations he revealed himself as a sort of political pragmatist who would defend, or give clear priorities onto, the interests of the British Empire.

(1) Initially he put forward a plan which is, in nature, based on internationalism. The International Clearing Union (ICU) Plan has the value filled with internationalism. (The ICU Plan should be of important and urgent value in reconstructing the present international monetary system known as “non-system”.)

If he had been a purely academic scholar and put forward his own idea from the university or journalism, he would have critically argued the process developed in the sphere of international political economy from an internationalist point of view of internationalism.

(2) However, Keynes was not that sort of man. He put himself in the forefront of the reconstruction of international order. He also represented the interests of the British Empire, and was situatedfound himself in the a position in which he needed to adjust the whole, looking for some sort of compromise with the US in negotiation. Thus his political stance – of course, much influenced by his own political thought – greatly governed his action, making muchentailing considerable sacrifice for Keynes as a of his aspect as a scholar and a system designer.  

<Central idea of the ICU Plan>

The “genuine” ICU proposal (August 1942) basically runs as follows.

(i) The “parity” of a member nation defined as the exchange rate between its currency and the “bancor” is set uestablishedp on agreement among the member nations. Thereafter, when fundamental disequilibrium occurs, the nation concerned is allowed to change the parity subject to consultation. Thuserefore, the ICU adopts a kind of fixed exchange rate system.

      The Bbancor is an international currency only used only between central banks. It has a fixed exchange rate with gold. Each central bank of a member state has its own account in terms of bancor, through which international settlement is to be made. All the international transactions are carried to a the bancor account of a the central bank concerned. A firm, which exports (imports) goods, receives (pays) the currency required at a fixed rate in exchange for an export (import) bill, from (to) a the central bank concerned. Though a foreign exchange market exists and firms or individuals are free to exchange foreign currencies there, the rate is set up, in advance, at as a fixed rate by agreement. Even if the rate departs from the parity, it will soon return to itthe parity soon.

       It should be noted that an adjustment is made not made bythrough the intervention of a government but by means of transaction between a the central bank and firms or individuals, which would comparinge the parity with the exchange rate. In that sense, the ICU system is closer to the Gold Standard than the IMF system which operated up to the 1960s, albeit although all the three are fixed exchange rate systems. In the former two a the government does not intervenefere with on a the foreign exchange market but directly transacts with firms or individuals, while in the latter a the government intervenesferes with on the foreign exchange market but does not directly transacts with firms or individuals.

 

(ii) The ICU proposal stipulates that, in order to prevent a persistent increase in the balance of payments of a member nation, whether in the direction ofboth surplus and or deficit direction, a penalty should be imposed on it if the sum exceeds a prescribed value.

(iii) The ICU proposal stipulates that, in order to contribute to the growth in the world economy, overdraft facilities should be provided.

 

(iv) The ICU proposal advocates that, in order to provide funds for the primary commodity problem and the relief problem which the postwar world economy should befound itself faced with, the international institutions concerned should open their own bancor accounts.

(3) The negotiations between the UK and the US over an international monetary system started with a face-off of between the ICU plan (Keynes plan) and the SF plan (Stabilized Fund plan [White plan]) (October 1942). Through these negotiations Keynes played an outstanding role as a representative of the British side.

However, we can say that at an early stage, the initiative was gripped seized by the US side, as was seen in June 1943 when Keynes tried to integrate the two plans based on the White plan, meaning that he put the ICU aside. Although the British side made an effort partially to incorporate the features of the ICU pinto the White plan by monetizing unitas since as from September 1943, it finally gave it up the attempt in April 1944 due to a decline by the US.

(4) After thatSubsequently Keynes even came round to justifying the White plan on the    

ground that it was much more crucial to secure a financial aid from the US – a justification difficult to understand from the point of view of the ICU plan. He emerged as acame to show an aspect of pragmatist. What he aimed at was to maintain the position of the

British Empire in the postwar world through financial aid from the US, by cooperating with it rather than holding out against it.

ThenAs to both the commodity plan and the relief and reconstruction plan, what

Keynes initially aimed at came to be completely foiled at an early stage (February 1942 – February 1943). Under these situationssituations, Keynes might have

hoped somehow to establish an international monetary system by accepting the

US plan, albeit incomplete.

     Keynes had been considered that without the help from the US the British Empire might collapse. It should be noted, in this respect, that he had not a the slightest idea of emancipating the colonies (for example, as a strategy which the UK should adopt after the Far East area was liberated, Keynes argued that the problem should be coped with, without resort to Roosevelt for help, through cooperation within the British Empire. Cf. his letter to Eady of 3 January 1945 on “UNRRA and British Liberated Territories in the Far East”).

     How could we interpret the changed stance which Keynes showed through

these negotiations? This is quite as interesting and veryas it is difficult to answer.

(5) Therefore, when considering these problems, we need to think ofbear in mind the fact    

that we encounter two Keynes – Keynes as an advocate of internationalism and Keynes as a representative figure of engaged in actual political negotiation. When considering the latter aspect, we need to examine in concrete terms how he came to make compromise. Any researchers who are interested in this field is required tomust have a coolconsiderable insight eye, for Keynes had neither appeared to make, nor spoken of, some sort of compromise throughout these negotiations.

                     5. Conclusion

There were three aspects in Keynes – an advocate of internationalism as a planner and a defender of the interests of the British Empire – and he had a pragmatist tendency to change his stance accordingly as the situation developed.

  In the initial period, Keynes designed and put forward plans filled with the spirit of internationalism for the commodity problem, the relief and reconstruction problem, and the international monetary system, which were considered to be important in constructing the postwar world order. These clearly showed Keynes’s excellence in internationalism as a system planner, although they were also to safeguard the interests of the British Empire.

  As the political and economic matters proceeded, however, Keynes came to show his pragmatic side, among other things making it a priority to protect the interests of the British Empire.

We would refer to Keynes’s view on international political mechanics as seen in

his letterto Dalton (March 27, 1946). There he stresses the importance of securing the position of the British Empire in relation to the US, ideas such as “objectivity”, “internationality” being putting aside.

    Nothing can suit us better, therefore, than that international institutions, where we are free to play a very important part, should administer what will be largely American funds for the succor of these regions. Nor is there any obvious ground why we should not refer to these bodies in the same way the difficulties of other regions, such as Malaya and Burma, where the initial responsibility is primarily ours. (CWK.26, p.230)

   

　　… I firmly believe that the whole of the British Commonwealth and the

Sterling Area and of Europe stood closer to us than to the Americans and

looked to us, rather than to them, for leadership. (CWK.26, p.231)

This is almost his last statement. In fact, the British Empire was thereafter to go on declining. The lifting of the frozen sterling balance abroad was to bring about the pound crisis. And above all, due to the surge of the USSR, the world politics was to be ruled by the US and the USSR, while the British Empire was to expose its fragility to the world in the Suez Crisis, which was soon to cause the independence of many colonies.

  Keynes himself was deeply concerned with the deterioration of the British financial position as the war proceeded. As in the First World War, Keynes was to play a key role in loan negotiations with the USA. This was indeed a continuum of humiliation.

We will conclude this report by saying that, from the point of view of world politics, Keynes was an architect of the international order as well as a defender of the British Empire, although from the perspective of social philosophy he was a champion of the ‘New Liberalism’.

* The three papers are

 Paper 1: Commodity Control Scheme

Paper 2: Relief and Reconstruction Plan

Paper 3: Keynes’s Battle over the International Monetary System

[Original Papers]

Hirai, T. (2011), “Keynes and the Transmutation Process of the Plan for Commodity Control Scheme”, ESHET Conference (Bogazici University, Istanbul), May.

Hirai, T. (2013), “International Design and the British Empire”, History of Economics Review, 55, 2.

Hirai, T. (2015), “Keynes’s Battle over the International Monetary System”, ESHET Conference (University of Rome <Tre>), May.

On Ralph Hawtrey’s Thought and Things – Struggling to Build a Bridge between “Theory of Aspects” and “Science” Toshiaki Hirai (Sophia University)

(The European Society for the History of Economic Thought

XXe Congrès – Paris 2016, 28 Mai 2016 – Paris, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

On Ralph Hawtrey’s Thought and Things

 – Struggling to Build a Bridge between “Theory of Aspects” and “Science”

   

Toshiaki Hirai

(Sophia University)

1. Introduction

                              

Hawtrey (1879-1975) is well-known as an economist who developed a monetary theory of economic fluctuations in, e.g. Good and Bad Trade [Hawtrey, 1913] and Trade and Credit [Hawtrey, 1928] as well as advocating the so-called “Treasury View” - in contrast with Keynes’s understanding. Furthermore, he was severely critical of Keynes as the author of the Treatise from his own theoretical stance. 

Predominant in Hawtrey’s intellectual background was Cambridge – among other things, his experience as an Apostle was of great significance – although he was not to spend his academic life there. He worked as the only economist within the Treasury, which he entered after graduation and where he stayed until retirement.

  In the field of social philosophy he published two books – The Economic Problem¹ [Hawtrey, 1926], and Economic Destiny [Hawtrey, 1944]. In addition, he left an unpublished book, Right Policy: The Place of Value Judgements in Politics, which was judged to have been written in the evening of his life (Hawtrey Papers, 12/2. Composed of 18 chapters, 528 sheets of typescript) ². This critically examines the sphere of economics, sociology and political science, based on Moore’s ethics - including “the impossibility of the definition of goodness”. “Value Judgements” in the subtitle indicates judgements in view of (what he calls) “true ends”).

  What the present paper aims at, on the other hand, is Hawtrey’s philosophy which underlies his economic theory and social philosophy. Although he had taken an interest in philosophy throughout his life, he expressed his own philosophical view in only one unpublished book, Thought and Things (Hawtrey Papers, 12/1. Composed of 8 chapters, and 314 sheets of typescript). Although it is unclear at what stage of his development this was written, he dedicates a great deal of room to discussion of A Materialist Theory of Mind (Armstrong [1968]), showing it was written in his last years.

  Thought and Things has the following TOC: Ch.1 Aspects, Ch.2 Cause, Ch.3 Purpose, Ch.4 Thought, Ch.5 Truth and Inference, Ch.6 Science, Ch.7 Philosophy, Ch.8 Man and His World.

  The present paper runs as follows. Firstly, the theory of aspects which should be the substance of Hawtrey’s philosophy is examined. Secondly, we consider his basic

ideas on mind and matter. Finally, we evaluate his philosophy taking into account the context of philosophical currents in Cambridge at that time.

  No one seems to have studied Thought and Things³ so far, which may justify examination of it in a heuristic way. The vivid impression that I have received of the book as a whole is that it should be read in terms of an intellectual struggle searching for a bridge between a theory of aspect peculiar to Hawtrey and scientific knowledge. The main theme of this paper lies precisely here.

          　　            2. Theory of Aspect

2.1 Fundamental framework

To put Hawtrey’s philosophy in a nutshell, it may be seen as “a theory of aspect” ⁴. He put forward the main theme of Thought and Things in the Preface as follows.

    The leading theme of this book is the analysis of thought into the discernment of aspects in conscious experience. A predicate is an aspect of a subject. A relation is an aspect of two or more related terms.

     The mind, in discerning an aspect, makes contact with truth, but only

with truth about its own experience. (Preface, pp.1-2)

Taking this as the starting point, let us examine the fundamental framework of the theory of aspect argued in the book. (Incidentally, although “A predicate is … related terms.” is very difficult to understand, it is quoted here due to its importance. The meaning is made clearer on p.150, which we will deal with in Section 3.1 below.)

The main element is Mind. Before the mind, the field of consciousness which the mind can access expands. In other words, the mind creates the field of consciousness through making consciousness work.

What, then, does the main take as its object? In a word, “things”. However, the mind cannot get hold of things directly. It brings them into the field of consciousness, in fact, by means of the “senses” (sight, touch, hearing and so forth), that is, “sense experience”. This is called “conscious experience”, as a result of which “aspects” emerge.

The mind discerns some aspects from multiple aspects which appear in the field of consciousness. That is, “The discernment of an aspect is an activity of the mind exercised upon a state of the mind” (Preface, pp.1-2).

Although Hawtrey holds that an aspect potentially comes into being in the field of consciousness, he does not think that it objectively exists, independently of the mind. The mind discerns aspects which potentially exist, and aspects are not considered able to exist without the mind. In the above quotation, “The mind, in discerning an aspect, makes contact with truth, but only with truth about its own experience; as “but only …”, it should be noted in particular that truth is established only in relation to the mind’s experience.

      … discernment of an aspect can only be true. That is so because the aspect is inherent in an experience which is wholly present to the mind. The mind notices an aspect which is already there to be selected for notice (my emphasis added, pp. 3-4).

An aspect is an aspect to the mind, and claims no independent existence. (p.123)

Let us recapitulate what have seen so far. The mind sees, a thing, say, a “chair”. Several aspects, through sense experience, “sight”, enter the field of consciousness of the mind, such as “it is made of wood; it has four legs; it is brown” and so forth. It depends on the state of mind how many of such aspects the mind can discern. This discernment is (the first form of) “thought”.

  Concerning the nature of aspect, another point is worth noting, namely that an aspect exists as a part of the whole in an inseparable way.

　　 An aspect has its own field, which is so much of the entire field as contributes

to it. But the aspect is not a part of its field. (p. 11)

… when we discern a part of any object, is not the part discerned an aspect of the whole? No, the aspect discerned is not the separable part but the relation of the part to the whole. (pp. 11-12)

What this means is that a part discerned should not be regarded as a portion separable from the whole, but as a part to the whole.

What calls for particular attention here is the existence of things; Hawtrey argues that the mind cannot possibly prove existence. What the mind receives is aspects only. However, as will be seen in Section 2, he is inclined to grasp aspects as intersubjective, or even implies that they are more objective, and more trans-time.

“The whole field of consciousness” is not confined to the field of consciousness mind can make contact with through “sense experience” – such as recognition of a person’s face, appreciation of paintings . Besides these, several states which are induced within the mind – from moral, feeling, volition, thought, concept through uncertainty, probability to mathematical propositions, mathematical inference, empirical inference – are also grasped in terms of aspects. The whole field of consciousness is considered to be composed of these two fields (cf.p.209. Fig.1)⁵.

Before proceeding to explain aspects obtained in these two fields, the first point to consider is why Hawtrey came to choose, as the title of this book, Thought and Things rather than A Theory of Aspect, for the title holds deep implications regarding his conception of philosophy.

  “Thought”, as we have seen, refers to the mind’s action in discerning aspects, epitomizing the theory of aspect which he attributed with a central role in Thought and Things. On the other hand, “Things” are what science sets as the object of research, epitomizing science. Thus he chose the title, Thought and Things, as implicating “A Theory of Aspect and Science”.

  These two words are proposed with the following implications. On the one hand,

they are presented as contrasting, although both are equally recognized. On the other hand, a way to organise or integrate them systematically⁶ is sought.

                       

(Fig.１) The Whole Field of Consciousness

The whole field of consciousness　　　　　　the field accessible through sense experience （ex.：recognition of a person’s face, appreciation of paintings)                        the states induced within the mind （moral, feeling, volition, thought, concept） (uncertainty, probability) (mathematical proposition, mathematical inference, empirical inference) and so forth

  In the theory of aspect, the existence of things is presupposed. The mind can neither prove their existence nor have means to recognize it correctly. Based on these recognitions the theory of aspect is developed. Meanwhile, in science the existence of things is also presupposed at the root of theory. Science cannot prove their existence. Despite these circumstances, the two fields of knowledge have been developed. Nevertheless, Hawtrey does not shirk the question: Should we allow this “dualism” to go on?

Starting from this fundamental recognition, Hawtrey proposes his theory of aspect as a philosophy of the field which science cannot grasp. We saw at the beginning of this paper that Hawtrey stated that “The leading theme of this book is the analysis of thought into the discernment of aspects in conscious experience”. This statement follows from the above recognition, which is summed up in the title, Thought and Things.

2.2 Aspect Obtained through Sense Experience

Let us take an example of an aspect obtained through sense experience.

Suppose that there is a chair in front of a person. The mind of the person grasps some aspects through sense experience such as seeing (sight) or touching (touch) it.

Here we must bear in mind the distinction between things and aspects. Hawtrey argues that one cannot prove the existence of things, which may show some affinity to Kant’s “thing in itself”. It is the aspects which appear in relation to a chair that the mind can discern through sense experience. Aspects stand in relation to a chair, and are to be discerned by the mind – they do not exist independently of the mind. Of the aspects which emerge before the mind, what the mind is able to discern become aspects. If not, they remain hidden, argues Hawtrey. For example, an artist can discern some aspects in painting that the majority of people fail to perceive.

  Although aspects may be “intersubjective” in the sense that they simultaneously appear in the two minds, this does not mean that they exist outside the two minds. Aspects could be defined as “intersubjective” existence in the field of consciousness.

  How could we be sure that anything besides one’s mind really exists? What exists outside one’s mind should be recognizable only when one’s mind discerns it at the level of aspects in the field of consciousness. Aspects thus discerned are accumulated in one’s mind, argues Hawtrey.

  Let us compare the theory of sense-data⁷ and the theory of aspect. What is similar is

that the former argues that the mind gets data from the object through sense experience, while the latter argues that the mind gets an aspect from the object through sense experience. What is different is that the former regards the data as subjective while the latter regards the aspect as intersubjective, appearing in the field of consciousness. It should be noted that the theory of aspect takes into consideration the states induced in the mind as well.

  Fussert’s “Noema” might correspond to what integrates various aspects. For Noema, which is not true reality, is obtained by grasping things consciously through sense experience (“things as objects of consciousness”). However, as Noema is considered to be subjective, it is different from aspects.

  So far we have stated that aspects, existing in the field of consciousness, are to be seen as intersubjective. However, the word, “intersubjective” here implies that aspects appear widely in the minds of many people. In this sense, this word comes closer to “objective”, as is borne out in Hawtrey’s argument on Platonic ideas.

… the foundation of the Platonic theory was the independent reality of the ideas. Their reality meant something different from the reality of things existing in time and space. … So l should be inclined to say that all aspects exist timelessly in the same way as the Platonic ideas.（p.273）

  Suppose that, say, there is a chair in front of ten people. There exist ten minds, each of which forms ten fields of consciousness through sense experience vis-à-vis the chair. In these circumstances there potentially exist several aspects which are commonly seen in these fields of consciousness. How many aspects are discerned will depend on the state of each mind. Thus interpreted, aspects are intersubjective, and with an increasing number of minds the aspects may approach an “objective” condition.

2.3 Aspects Obtained as the States Induced in the Mind

The field of consciousness is not only open to sense experience but also extends through the states induced within the mind (cf. Fig. 1 and p.209), which may include, for example: moral, feeling, volition, thought, concept; uncertainty, probability; mathematical propositions, mathematical inferences, empirical inferences.

  They are different, in nature, from the aspects obtained through sense experience, for they are aspects which are induced in the mind, to a certain extent independent of the outer world. Let us take thought, concepts, knowledge, which Hawtrey mentioned as representative. (The others are kept for other occasions).

(a) Thought                     

“Thought” is discernment of an aspect. Hawtrey states that “I would go further and say that all thought consists in the discernment of aspects of experience. … Each possible thought consists in noticing a particular aspect, that is to say, selecting this aspect for attention from the whole field of consciousness” (p.109).

　Thought centers around a proposition. It establishes itself, choosing aspects and combining them. The aspects thus chosen and discerned are either “attributes” or “relations” (cf. p.150). That is, by combining aspects as “attributes” and those as “relations”, a thought establishes itself. While sense experience is simultaneous, thought is characterised by inference.

  Thought may belong to the stage next to intuitive aspects, which have no interpretation – that is, the stage when an interpretation of experience is made.

This is clear in the following.

   

　　 The aspect discerned is an attribute or a relation. In the case of an intuitive aspect, untouched by interpretation, the predicate has no other subject than the field of consciousness or a part of the field. The interpretation of experience supplies the predicates with subjects and the relations with terms: things, persons and places, in which the aspects are to be discerned. (p.150)

This passage has much the same meaning as the following part of the first quotation in this paper – “A predicate is an aspect of a subject. A relation is an aspect of two or more related terms”. That is, “an aspect of a subject” is “an intuitive aspect” while “a relation … terms” corresponds to “the interpretation of experience”.

(b) Concept               

With regard to what occurs within the mind in relation to a concept, two terms are proposed – familiarity and association.

 Familiarity is a feeling attached to a concept (cf. p.143). It has two types (cf. p.135). One is the familiarity with the particular past occurrences of an aspect, to which associations point. This occurs in the initial stage of the formation of a concept. The other is the familiarity with the concept itself, which develops thereafter. The associations usually stop there.

  The mind embraces several aspects accordingly as, through a certain “familiarity”, associations continue to be induced. By combining these aspects a certain “concept” comes into being (cf. p. 144)⁸.

  A concept is an abstraction, and an aspect is elaborated by interpretation. If a certain aspect is familiarized, it becomes a starting point for associations. By following it, the mind can search for its past experience through “memory”.

(c) Knowledge             

“Knowledge” is a belief grounded on several aspects discerned (cf. pp.151, 199). Knowledge accumulated in the mind is composed of “familiarized” aspects and “familiarized” concepts (cf. p.154).

We may put it thus. A combination of aspects, through which a concept is formed, becomes familiar through repetitive occurrence of a particular type (cf. p.145). A façade of aspects through which a concept is recognized becomes a key to a series of “associations” (cf. p.163).

Upon the stock of memories and concepts is built the structure of thoughts or beliefs constituting knowledge. (p.150)

The concept is the subjects of which the aspects are predicates and relations.

  (p.141).

 What we have so far seen is summarized in Fig.2.

（Fig.2）Thought, Concept, Knowledge

Thought － Discernment of an aspect. Inferential. The stage at which an interpretation of experience is made. Concept － Several aspects combined through association of familiarity by the mind. 　　　　  　　　　 Knowledge　―　Belief grounded on several aspects discerned. “Knowledge” accumulated within the mind = “familiar” aspects + “familiar” concepts

  

3. Mind and Matter

3.1 The Main Theme               

As already pointed out, the title of Hawtrey’s book, “Thought and Things”, which the present paper intends to examine, has the implication of “A Theory of an Aspect and Science”, which could be also expressed as “Mind and Matter”.

  Hawtrey takes both mental occurrences, such as thought, imagination, feeling, volition and material objects, as “facts”. This is characteristic of his broad approach. He argues that although a “thing in itself” should be unrecognizable, the mind can discern aspects through sense experience, while he accepts scientific knowledge by recognizing the existence of “material objects” – he seems to make a philosophical effort to incorporate scientific knowledge into the theory of aspect.

  Mental occurrences are, as we have seen, the principal actors of Hawtrey’s theory of aspect, and he argues that they are “facts”.

What is presented to the mind is either sense experience or the operation of the mind itself, thought, imagination, feeling or volition. These mental occurrences are facts. (p.209)

At the same time, he argues that material objects are “facts” as well. In his argument here, a “causal hypothesis” appears in relation to sense experience, in which material substance is included as fact. Arguing along this line, he seems to be considering how “a theory of aspect” should be connected with “science”.

  If one were to focus solely on the mind and confine attention to a “theory of aspect” in which sense experience and the states induced within the mind appear, one could not explain the world which science has so far explored. Moreover, the states induced within the mind, as we have seen, include not only thought and concepts but also mathematical propositions, mathematical inferences and empirical inference, all of which are used as indispensable tools in science. If this is the case we must recognise the fundamental importance of a philosophy which is not driven away by science, exploring how the “theory of aspect” could be compatible with “science”. For Hawtrey, inquiry in this direction appears to be the essential challenge.

  “It does not address the true solution to argue mind and matter separately. But philosophy which stresses material only and neglects mind misses the fundamental problem.” – According to Hawtrey, as science has developed, philosophy, which neglects or ignores the philosophical point of view which focuses on mind, has become more and more influential. Logical positivism and behaviorism are emblematic of this trend. In his philosophy Hawtrey shows a keenly critical attitude towards these tendencies. Let us consider a passage, though a little long, which makes this point clear.

                                                                                             

Sense experience puts in a claim to be something more than mental, in that it seems to be imposed on the mind by some agency other than the mind. And the causal hypothesis supports the claim by tracing sense experience through chains of causation to matter.

       The causal hypothesis, in the form which we instinctively believe, includes the reality of matter. We take the outside agency of causation to be a fact, and each particular material object to be a fact. And, as I have shown, other human beings are given the status of facts, independently of the reality of matter. Their thoughts and feelings are held to be facts like one’s own.  When I think about an actual material object, my thought is one fact and the material object is another.

       A material object embodies the concept of its kind, and exhibits the aspects contained in the concept, together with the Aristotelian accidents, aspects which belong to it as an empirical particular and are not deducible from the concept.

       Thoughts and feelings form part of the field of consciousness and exhibit aspects and concepts, though they do not fit into kinds so simply as material objects.  (p.209)

A characteristic common to all the mental occurrences of which experience consists is that they are real. Reality is an aspect discerned in them, and the causal hypothesis extends to matter the same concept of reality that is discerned in experience. That is an inevitable inference from the hypothesis which traces sense experience to causes emanating from a world of material objects. (p.211)

Insofar as the human being is an entity that recognizes everything through the action of the mind, science by scientists cannot be explored without this procedure.  The above passage, “A material object embodies the concept of its kind, and exhibits the aspects contained in the concept, together with … from the concept” is grounded precisely on this recognition. “A material object” is related to a “concept” and an “aspect”.

  The following passage also shows his stance in moving on beyond “dualism” (separation between mind and matter), by pointing out the relation between the “theory of aspect” and “science”.

The discernment of an aspect is an activity of the mind exercised upon a state of the mind, but the common aspect of the field of consciousness and the nature posited by science is the essential link between mind and fact. (Preface, pp.1-2)

An aspect which exists in the field of consciousness according to the theory of aspect, and the nature as posited by science should constitute an essential link between mind and fact.

Hawtrey does not take the view that ascribes substance to matter alone (i.e. Materialism). He argues that the causal hypothesis, which “takes over the concepts of reality and of extension over time, and applies them to matter, … does not absolutely require the reality to have all the characteristics attributed to matter”. (p.253b)

However, Hawtrey reveals that his own theory of aspects has some problems as well.

But the dualism which makes reality consist of matter and mind, and allows importance only to mind, is far from satisfying the requirements of logos.

    I have suggested at the end of Chapter VI that Professor Armstrong’s form of materialism might supersede this dualism. Matter would be the only form of existence, while mind would be a real activity of matter. Any genuine simplification in philosophy may be presumed to be in harmony with logos.  At the same time I do not think a simplification of the concept of substance goes far towards rationalising the causal hypothesis. The concept of matter as the substance in which causal efficacy is rooted, is a mere token of reality.  An anthropocentric philosophy does not fit into a material universe, in which man occupies a physically insignificant place. (p.310)

3.2 Science

As we have seen, Hawtrey sets out his “theory of aspect” as the main pillar of his philosophy. At the same time, however, he recognizes the role which “science” has played, and tries to see how it could be compatible with the “theory of aspect”. However, in Thought and Things he does not arrive at a final solution. Together with “Thought and Things”, we find expressions such as “A Theory of Aspect and Science”, “Mind and Material”, “Mind and Facts”. All of them are expressions showing how this dualism could be avoided.

  That said, let us see how he takes the problem which science or philosophy of science finds itself faced with.

　Hawtrey does not see the theory of aspect and science as being built on different principles. He tries to view science, rather, as an extension of the theory of aspect (which could be generalised as philosophy in this context).

Let us remember that science embraces physics, which ranges from macro phenomena like celestial movement and the structure of the universe to micro phenomena such as the origin of material – molecules, atoms, atomic nuclei, DNA – or physiology, which explores human organs such as the brain and heart in relation to the movement of nerve cells. The development of science has exerted great influence on the worldview of mankind from the 17^th century to this day, excluding philosophy and theology from these problems. Under these circumstances, how did Hawtrey, who proposed a theory of aspect, attempt to position science within his philosophy? – This is the problem we address here.

Philosophers have sought an aspect of the universe which will be plausible, which, that is, will be exposed to the least possible degree of intrinsic doubtfulness, and will command the highest attainable degree of credibility.  At the outset they are faced with the difficulty that what is known about the Universe is very incomplete. In order to form an aspect of the whole, they must fill up the gaps so far as they can. That is to say, they must construct a concept of the entire realm of existence. In doing so, they are pursuing the method of scientific discovery by framing hypotheses to account for experience, but they are trespassing beyond the limits of science, because they are adopting hypotheses which cannot be verified. In default of verification they have to appeal to intrinsic probability. (pp.257-258)

In these conditions philosophers considered the universe. Although a method of scientific discovery was applied, scientists in the modern sense were yet to appear.

 

  Here the “causal hypothesis” comes into play.　

The causal hypothesis introduces into thought its own characteristic form of inference. Cause implies effect. Empirical reasoning seeks a concept with   causal properties, to explain some sequence in experience. The causal properties may be nothing more than a crude rule to the effect that a certain type of event is always followed by a certain other type of event. (p.169)

Causal hypotheses are used both in the theory of aspect and the theory of science, having, respectively, mind and matter as initial cause.

　　Mind and matter have been posited by the causal hypothesis, each to be the vehicle of its own characteristic causal activity: matter can serve as the vehicle of physical movement, because it has spatial characteristics; mind can be the vehicle of conscious experience. Each acts in its own special sphere. (p.253)

Matter is the hypothetical vehicle of causality, and must in some way carry the spatial and temporal relations which are the subject matter of physical causality. (p.263)

Here we need to turn our attention to the theory of science. When a causal hypothesis is adopted in science, it cannot determine the initial cause however far it might trace it back. For the initial mover cannot, by nature, explained be by a causal hypothesis. It is “matter” that is introduced as the driving force of a causal relation. Scientific explanation depends on it.

  However, Hawtrey argues that the concept of “matter” used in science is far from complete. In the first place, even if a “causal feature” and a “spatial feature” are made use of, the relation to integrate the two is by no means clarified.

　　But when we ask what is in the concept of matter which determines all the causal properties, there is no answer. Hume’s scepticism holds the field. The concept of matter is incomplete, for the causal properties are super-imposed on the spatial qualities without any specifiable relation calculated to unify them. (p.260)

Scientists are satisfied nowadays with the acceptance of their conclusions as a mere description of the orderliness of experience. The reality of matter is not an alternative to this position, but is an additional hypothesis, the plausibility of which depends on the degree of credibility of the concept of matter itself. (p.259)

When we carry the assumptions of science into the sphere of life and of mind, the incompleteness of the concept of matter becomes more conspicuous. The discovery of formulas governing the behaviour of the sub-atoms in living organisms is no more than an aspiration. If it is ever to be fulfilled, we cannot foresee even in barest outline what the concept will be like. (p.260)

Hawtrey’s view in these spheres includes another important concept – “probability”. This embraces not only calculable but also incalculable probability. Hawtrey argues, moreover, that this is applicable not only to mental processes but also to the sphere of the substance of matter.

　　 Only exceptionally is the probability of a particular empirical proposition susceptible of numerical measurement. In other cases there is a direct judgement of a greater or smaller degree of probability. There seems to be no reason why the same mental process which leads to an estimate of probability in those cases should not apply to the plausibility of a view of the universe, such as the reality of matter. (p.259)

These observations show strong affinity with Keynes’s concept of “probability”.

3.3 Criticism of Behaviorism and Logical Positivism

Hawtrey pursued the investigation into how scientific recognition could be bridged with the “theory of aspect”. On the other hand, he made explicit criticism of the philosophy which stresses the importance of science, emphasizing matter. He argued against behaviorism, logical positivism, scientism, materialism (and historical materialism). Here we will consider the first two objects of his criticism.

(a) Behaviorism

Of the stance taken in behaviorism on the delicate relation between science and mind, Hawtrey is critical. Behaviorism argues that the mental activity of human beings is closely related to the nerves or some portion of brain, so that irrespective of, or independent of, how one thinks, the mental activity of human beings should be explicable.

　  Not only does sense experience correspond to the state of the physical senses,    

but it is held that the mental processes of thought, feeling and volition, which intervene in the making of decisions, also have physical counterparts in the brain and nervous system, forming a self-contained causal chain, the action of which is independent of the mind. The mind would be no more than a passive record of the physical sequence, an epiphenomenon. (p.226)

                                                                                              

The postulate of behaviourism is a hypothesis which would extend the mechanistic explanation to the facts of psychology and to our apparently purposive action. .… The postulate therefore remains for its adherents an act of faith.  (p.227)

How should we understand the relation between the mind’s conscious action and the functional activity of the person’s brain and nerve system corresponding to it? Behaviorists as well as materialists stress the above postulate (materialistic view), while Hawtrey supports the “mind” view. As have seen, Hawtrey, moreover, aims to explore the relation between mind and matter - thought and things.

The postulate of behaviourism denies the common sense belief that the purposive behaviour of human bodies can only be interpreted as presupposing conscious direction. …There is a fundamental difference between a field of consciousness and a field of mechanistic causation.  (p.241)

The question is whether there can be a perfect correspondence between the field of consciousness, in which action is determined by preference, and the field of mechanism, in which action is determined by causal uniformity. (p.242)

Let us take up a simple case. Suppose someone is faced with a choice between two flowers – rose and amaryllis. The person chooses amaryllis, for he knows that the host in the family who invited him is very fond of amaryllis, though he himself loves roses. How could a behaviorist explain this phenomenon in terms of the activity of a brain and nervous system? This must be impossible to explain even if science makes miraculous progress. The above case of the rose and amaryllis is a problem which an analysis based on the activity of brain cells and the nervous system cannot tackle.

I believe the theory of aspects has a bearing on this question [whether or not physiology will come to be able to explain behavior in a self-contained way independently of the mental processes], in that the discernment of aspects is an essentially mental process, which cannot have an adequate physical counterpart. (p. 227. The square brackets are mine.)

Conscious direction by human beings has the maximum degree of intrinsic probability.（p.263）

By contrast, Hawtrey makes to some extent a positive assessment of Gestalt psychology, stating that it shares some elements in common with the theory of aspect.

Thus the Gestalt Psychologists may be regarded as introducing aspects into

psychology. (p.245)

Hawtrey, however, comments that, alas, the Gestalt psychologists express support of the behaviorists’ view of the relation between mind and matter.

(b) Logical Positivism

Hawtrey is also critical of logical positivism, which excludes metaphysics from its field of study on the ground that it is not verifiable, arguing that it lacks the point of view of perception in the field of consciousness.

  Logical positivism regards verification as essential to the meaning of a proposition. Hawtrey takes A.J. Ayer, a representative of this school, as object of his criticism.

His [Ayer’s] twofold division of knowledge into empirical judgements, which are subject to verification, and analytic judgements, which are tautologous, supports the extreme empiricism of logical positivism. (p.181)

     Professor Ayer in his contribution to The Revolution in Philosophy (p.74) explains that “statements like those of metaphysics, to the truth of which no empirical observation could possibly be relevant, are ruled out as factually meaningless. The emphasis here is on the word ‘factually’ – not capable of stating facts”. (p.182)

However, he argues that aspects which exist in the state of consciousness, which is the theater of the theory of aspect, are indeed essential to our recognition, and yet not of a nature which requires verification.

                                                                                                                  

  But it is not only aspects of sense experience that provide a kind of knowing which does not need verification. Aspects of states of consciousness other than sense experience are of the same kind. (p.182a)

The contention of logical positivism that verifiability is essential to truth is untenable. (p.182b)

Hawtrey is highly critical of Ayer’s explanation of Kant’s analytical judgment and synthetic judgment from the point of view of the theory of aspect. Above all, the following observation regarding mathematics is worth noting. As shown in Fig.1, “The Whole Field of Consciousness”, mathematical propositions and mathematical inference are included in “the states induced within mind”.

　  Professor Ayer criticised Kant’s argument for the synthetic nature of mathematics on the ground that the question was not a psychological one but a logical one. But knowledge is psychological. To treat the matter as purely logical meant ignoring the limitations to which the human mind’s knowledge is subject. (p.179)

Hawtrey argues that mathematics is not purely logical, but is subject to the limitations of the mind’s knowledge.

Recognition of a kind of knowing of physical objects which claims the same kind of directness as the propositions of mathematics, conflicts with this division [empirical judgment and analytical judgment]. (pp. 181-182)

In fact, logical positivism as composed of empirical judgment which requires verification and analytical judgment which is tautology (mathematics belongs to this category) embodies self-contradiction as philosophy of science, for the reason why mathematics is required together with empirical judgment is not clarified at all.

  Moreover, Hawtrey argues the difference between “empirical reasoning” (it should be noted that this is reasoning in the theory of aspect, different from empirical judgment in logical positivism) and mathematical reasoning.

     While in empirical reasoning synthesis means a comparison of objects with a view to revealing common qualities or aspects, in mathematical reasoning comparison is dispensed with, because numbers are known a priori to have the common characteristic of all being linked to their neighbouring numbers by the plus-one relation. (p.144)

It is in his argument of probability that Hawtrey’s point of argument becomes clearer.

Probability, like size or distance, is an aspect to be discerned; it is an aspect of the thought which asserts a proposition. (p.158)

“An aspect of the thought … proposition” might basically rest on the same idea as the concept of probability in Keynes’s Treatise on Probability and Russell’s subsequent considerations.

  Thus a judgement of probability applied to a philosophical interpretation of the universe comes under the head of Lord Russell’s “intrinsic doubtfulness”, or “degree of credibility”. (p.257)

To recapitulate, Hawtrey thinks that “mathematical proposition, mathematical reasoning, probability” belong to “the states induced within mind”, and is critical of logical positivism, which neglects the mind and argues that science can make progress by excluding ideas related to the mind as “metaphysical”. First, it is a misconception of mathematics and probability. Secondly, it is a misconception of science (though science per se remains important).

4. Philosophical Currents in Cambridge

Hawtrey was an ardent supporter of G.E. Moore’s philosophy, and its influence continued throughout his life. Moreover, he was an apostle, and deeply involved in in the Cambridge current of philosophy. In Thought and Things, naturally enough, he referred to Cambridge philosophers such as Moore, Russell, Keynes, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and so forth in various pages⁹ (although on the whole there are few if any points in which he shows a critical attitude towards them – despite the differences between his view and theirs).

  To my knowledge, there is no material in the book indicating what sort of discussion was held among them. That said, in this section, let us make a brief survey of the currents of Cambridge philosophy, taking Hawtrey’s philosophy into consideration.

4.1 G.E. Moore

It is well-known that Moore came to lead Cambridge philosophy in a new direction, criticizing MacTaggart, who represented Hegelian Idealism in the UK. Influenced by Moore, Russell stated that he, too, had decided to depart from that line.

  That said, Moore was not an empiricist, and was very critical of pragmatism, as can be seen in his criticism of James’ rationalism. 

With regard to the controversy between scientism and the Neo-Kantian School which advocated “Return to Kant” as a motto and could be characterised as transcendental, Moore was sympathetic with the latter.

  Moore’s s way of thinking has a certain affinity with that of Socrates and Plato. The approach, asking “what is Goodness” and pursuing it, is strongly reminiscent of Socrates. And yet, he does not move forward to a theory of ideas. Rather, he conceives of “Goodness” in a presentative way, arguing that it is impossible to define. Moreover, he criticizes, a number of philosophical approaches, including utilitarianism, from the point of view of intuitionism, stating that they are subject to the “naturalistic fallacy”. The idea of “sense data”, which influenced Russell among others, is also important for a knowledge of Moore’s philosophy.

  The ideas Moore proposed exerted a great influence on Keynes and his contemporaries including Hawtrey, Lytton Strachey, Shove and Leonard Woolf. They are, on the whole, critical of utilitarianism (Here Keynes’s view on Edgeworth (1926) is worth noting).

  As is clear from his way of argument, Moore was inclined to take language very seriously. Thus he came to address the problem of language, and pay increasing attention to “ordinary language” and “common sense” in his philosophy.

  Attention to “ordinary language” was the stance adopted by the latter-day Wittgenstein - although he endorsed this element even in the Tractus Logico-Philosophicus. Moore regularly attended the lectures (1930-33) by Wittgenstein, who had returned to Cambridge, to the extent that he eventually published his notes on them.

It should be added that Hawtrey and Keynes seem not to have shared an interest

in “ordinary language”.

4.2 Russell

Russell’s philosophy is known as “logical atomism”, and is characterized thus:

　

　 The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms    that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be what I call ‘particulars’ – such things as little patches of colour or sounds, momentary things – and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis. (Russell, 1985 [1918], p.37)

Russell and Whitehead tried to reduce mathematics to logic in the Principia

Mathematica. Logical atomism makes a similar endeavor in the field of philosophy.

Russell’s philosophy, like Wittgenstein’s, became the bible of the “Vienna Circle” which advocated Logical Positivism (this was against the Neo-Kantian School, and adopted a motto, “purge metaphysics from science”).

  Logical atomism was to exert a deep influence on Keynes’s Treatise on

Probability. However, on the whole, more scholars seem to have taken a critical

attitude towards it in Cambridge. Wittgenstein showed some discordance from the

outset, and finally came to a clean break. Keynes also seems to have become

critical of logical atomism later. Ramsey was also critical. He moved in the

direction of Pragmatism. Hawtrey’s philosophy, Things and Thought, took a huge

distance from logical atomism, although no critical comments are to be found

there.

  There is a clear difference between Moore’s philosophy and Russell’s. The

contrasting relation can be summed up as ordinary language vs. ideal

language; or intuitionism vs. formal logic/logical atomism.

4.3 Keynes

Greatly influenced by Moore and Russell, Keynes wrote a dissertation for his King’s College fellowship - the prototype of what was to be published later as A Treatise on Probability. The book makes two major departures. ¹⁰

  The first departure consists in an inquiry into epistemology and logic in a world in which “probability” defined as “a degree of rational belief between propositions” was predominant. He stressed the “objective” logical relation between a premise and a proposition. By applying this relation to the field of “probability”, Keynes aimed at building the philosophical foundations for logical judgment based on human reason. “Indirect knowledge”, dealt with in A Treatise on Probability, is obtained through argument. When an argument is composed of a complicated set of sub-arguments, a knowledge of formal logic is indispensable. Thus recognition by rational human beings in the form of an axiomatic theoretical system is required. This is the main aim addressed in Book II.

Another departure is his justification of “Induction”. The theory of probability developed in Books I and II is directly connected to Book III, “Induction and Analogy”, in which Keynes argues that “induction is a problem of formal logic (the existence of the relation of probability) rather than a problem of facts”.

  According to him, induction is composed of “analogy” and “pure induction” (the latter refers to simple repetition of cases). Of the two, it is analogy which matters. He argues that a priori probability is obtained by analogy.

When knowledge is imperfect, analogy proceeds to the higher stages with the aid of pure induction. He went on to argue that induction can be justified, insofar as the number of “features of a thing” (such as “it has four legs”, “it has hair”) is limited either by “the method of perfect analogy” (which is due to an individual introspection) or by “other inductive method” (the method, by finding negative analogy with the aid of pure induction, of approaching perfect analogy).

Keynes did not write any article or book on philosophy thereafter, so we cannot know exactly whether he continued his early philosophy or not, except for a few short essays. That said, I am inclined to take the view that he changed his philosophy later for the following reasons.

Among other things, what mattered was the relation with Ramsey. It is well known that Ramsey favored pragmatism¹¹, unlike Moore and Keynes, and put forward a theory of subjective probability, which differed from Keynes’s theory of objective probability.

Meanwhile, Ramsey leveled some harsh criticism at Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, a great deal of which Keynes (1931) accepted.

  Keynes expressed his view that formal the logic of Russell and (the early-day) Wittgenstein proceeded in such a way as to be void of content, becoming “dry bones”, and ultimately excluding not only all experience but also almost all principles of rational thinking.

  Ramsey, by contrast, proposed a kind of pragmatism which addresses human logic, criticizing Wittgenstein (it is well known that serious discussion with Ramsey, and indeed with Sraffa,¹² made a great contribution to the emergence of the latter-day Wittgenstein).

  Ramsey distinguished human logic from formal logic. Man has a useful mental habit of dealing with things provided by sense and memory, and so has a consistent system by applying this to a logic of probability. Although calculation of probability belongs to formal logic, a degree of our belief should be like a part of clothes, and should be close to our sense or memory rather than to formal logic. Thus Keynes largely came round to accepting Ramsey’s view.

This is not to say, however, that Keynes was converted to Ramsey’s philosophy, for the latter-day Keynes did not accept series of subjective probability or pragmatism. What Keynes emphasized in “My Early Beliefs” (Keynes, 1939) is that he himself gradually departed from rationalism, and came to emphasize the importance of the ambiguity of the real world, and with it, therefore, custom and so forth¹³.

  As we have seen, Hawtrey expressed a sympathetic view of probability as expressed in Keynes’s Treatise on Probability¹⁴. He saw it, in terms of aspects, as one of the states induced within the mind.

Since no belief can be absolutely certain, every thought embodying a belief may be said to present this aspect (probability), but in general the aspect remains a mere potentiality and is not noticed. Only when the process by which a judgement has been arrived at is felt to be in some way insufficiently cogent to form a basis for action, is attention turned to its doubtfulness and it enters the stock of knowledge labelled “probable”. (p.161)

It should be added that there is no evidence left as to how Keynes judged Hawtrey’s theory of aspect.　

4.4 Wittgenstein

Around 1930, Wittgenstein began to doubt the “theory of logical determination” (Takiura, 1983, p.159) which is the principal framework of Tractus Logico-Philosophicus (written in 1918, and published in 1922), and through trial and error thereafter wrote the substance of Part 1 of Philosophical Investigations at the end of 1936 (the final version in 1949. This seems to be the beginning of the latter-day Wittgenstein who put forward the “language game” theory.

  Tractus Logico-Philosophicus is said to have made a great contribution to the emergence of logical positivism together with The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Russell, 1918). Especially in the development of the latter, Russell stated that he was greatly influenced by Wittgenstein, the author of the former, so it was understood that the two scholars were working in the same direction.

Even in this period, in fact, there was a great difference between the two. Wittegenstein was very critical of Russell’s philosophy. Moreover, as we saw above, Russell continued to stick to, and develop “a theory of logical atomism”, shifting from “an empirical approach” to “a rationalist approach”. See Pears). In the same period, Wittgenstein was to be deeply engaged in “language game” theory, so relations between the two went from tension to final rupture.

4.5 Theory of Aspect in Hawtrey and Wittgenstein

Let us now consider the difference between the two in theory of aspect. In the case of Hawtrey, “aspect” is intersubjective (semi-objective). There exist aspects (in this sense they are close to Platonic idea). He argues that each mind can grasp them. He tries to grasp things in such a way as many kinds of aspects are attached to them. Important concepts are then developed from them.

   What needs to be emphasized here is that Hawtrey’s theory of aspects can be traced back to Hawtrey (1912). It was read at the ‘Friday Club’ meeting of artists.

Though he argued out his theory of aspect, confining it to art – painting, music and so forth – we can see sufficient continuity to Thought and Things. One passage in particular is worth quoting.

If you have grasped what I mean by an aspect you will see of what vital importance it is to our minds. Both memory and imagination, so far as they relate to the objects of sense, deal primarily in aspects. Detail is filled in mainly by reason. (p.3)

On the other hand, in the case of Wittgenstein¹⁵, aspect, which is discussed in Part 2, Chapter 11 in Philosophical Investigations [Part 2 was completed in 1949], is regarded as a kind of image grasped by the mind. And it is perceived as a different image by each mind (see Jastrow’s famous “Duck-Rabbit Picture”). It is very subjective, so it does not exist objectively ¹⁶.

　Let us now go on to consider some of the similarities seen in the two

philosophies. Firstly, both show some closeness to Köhler’s Gestalt psychology

(cf.TT, 234, 244), and share psychological cogitations in common. Secondly, both

are critical of scientism and logical positivism. Thirdly, both are critical of

Russell’s logical atomism.

  Speaking of points of difference, the “language game ideas” adopted by

Wittgenstein are not recognizable in Hawtrey. In general, Wittgenstein attaches

weight to language, ordinary language, while Hawtery does not.

4.6 Hawtrey’s Philosophy Re-stated

Hawtrey took the perception of the field of consciousness through sense experience as the foundation of philosophy. In that sense his philosophy differs from the Platonic theory of ideas. We cannot prove the existence of things. We can grasp aspects consciously through sense experience, and have a capacity of recognition only through building them within the mind.

  On the other hand, Hawtrey criticizes logical positivism, which argues that because metaphysics cannot be empirical, science should expel it from the object of research.  He argues that it is a lacking in the view of perception of the field of consciousness.

  Finally, I would point out the two passages useful in understanding Hawtrey’s philosophical stance.

The reality of sense experience is the indispensable premise of any form of empiricism. (p.182)

Value judgements are among those metaphysical statements “to the truth of which no empirical observation could possibly be relevant”. (p.182b)

We have outlined the philosophical currents in Cambridge, which suffice to evidence its importance as a center in the world. It was under these circumstances that Hawtrey made his own philosophical explorations. Let me repeat, unhappily, we cannot find any document showing what kind of philosophical controversy Hawtrey engaged in with these philosophers under these circumstances.

5. Conclusion

We have examined Hawtrey’s unpublished book, Thought and Things. The main theory there seems to be the theory of aspect. It focuses on the mind’s selection which appears in the field of consciousness, from which it tries to explain the various mental products such as concept, knowledge and so forth. Hawtrey conceives of “an aspect” as intersubjective, or even extending to a more objective level.

  Then, as the title, “Thought and Things” shows, Hawtrey tackles the thorny old problem of how the relation between “mind and matter” or “theory of aspect and science” should be understood. We might say that the final aim of this unpublished book was to explore how one can build a bridge between the two, without falling into dualism. Though he did not reach the final answer, he developed his argument compellingly, aiming at building a bridge.

  Hawtrey was severely critical of behaviorism and logical positivism, which  looked at the world from a scientific point of view neglecting the mind. These criticisms are worth attention, for they argue that behaviorism and logical positivism are based on a misunderstanding of science and mathematics. Hawtrey points out the following – Concerning science, a causal hypothesis introduces “matter” as its prime mover without arguing a relation between “a causal property” and “spatial property”, so that the concept of matter is incomplete. Moreover, when it comes to the field of life and mind, the incompleteness of the concept of matter is much more conspicuous.

As for mathematical considerations, when we remember that Hawtrey argues “mathematical proposition” and “probability” in terms of “theory of aspect”, the distance from the approach of logical positivism is strikingly evident (See Fig. 1).

　1) Hirai (2007) examines this.

　2) Hirai (2009) and Hirai (2012) examine this.

3) In Google Scholar and EBSCO the author was able to find neither papers discussing Hawtrey’s philosophy nor documents concerning Thought and Things.

4) In the philosophical world, “the theory of aspect” is used for the argument in Part II of Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein (see, e.g. Shoroeder [2010], Arahata [2013]). There is no place for Hawtrey. For the relation between the two, see Section 4.

5) The theory of aspect examined so far is similar to Husserl’s phenomenology as a study of “conscious experience as experienced from a point of subjective view” (“intentionality, that is, directness of experience towards things in the world”. In that this experience includes “sense, thought, memory, imagination, feeling, volition, will”, there is a similarity.

However, in Thought and Things, there is no reference to phenomenology. That said, this idea emerges in phenomenology, deeply influenced by Kant. And evidently, Hawtrey himself was directly influenced by Kant. His answer to Hume was that the orderliness of sense experience dwells not in things in themselves but in the constitution of the observing mind. “Form is not to be looked for in the object in itself, but in the subject [the field of consciousness] to which the object appears”. (p.288. [   ] is the author’s)

6) Armstrong (1968) is mentioned. See T&T, pp.253b-253c, p.310.

7) See the theory of sense-data developed in Russell (1912). There it is argued as a relation between “appearance” and “reality”.

  8) “Familiarity” by Hawtrey is analogous to “Acquaintance” by Russell.

9) For frequent references, the following are mentioned: Russell (pp.13, 18,20,28,43, 132a, 132b, 139,140,159,160,161,165,166, 166a, 184, 185, 186,189, 195, 197, 198, 204, 209,257, 285, 286), Moore (pp.6-7, 96,100-102,130,131,132,132a,132b,182b), Keynes (156,157, 158,159, 160, 161).

　10) See Hirai (2002).　

11) There is no reference to pragmatism in Thought and Things.

  12) See Kurz (2009).

13) Itoh（1999, p.58）argues thus: Accepting Ramsey’s criticism, Keynes came to

relinquish “a logicism interpretation of probability” in A Treatise on

Probability and sought the “connection between uncertainty and rationality”

in “the world of transcendent propositions”, which is evident in The General

Theory.

  14) In “Probability” (pp.155a-161) in Thought and Things, three main themes

in Keynes’s Treatise on Probability – probability in the field of

immeasurability, the definition of probability, and “induction and analogy” –

are examined. Among other things, the second and the third points are

examined, taking Russell’s argument in Human Knowledge (esp. “intrinsic

doubtfulness”) into consideration.

15) There are two kinds of aspects in Wittgenstein – “aspect of changes” and

“continuous aspects”. Though there is a divergence of view as to which Wittgenstein attached more weight to, the latter appears to be closer to Hawtrey’s aspects.

　16) On aspects, there are references to Philosophical Investigations  (Wittgenstein, 1963) in Thought and Things (pp.11, 12,109, 110,131). However, Hawtrey has nothing to say about the difference between the two. Incidentally, reference to “theory of language game” is found on p. 194, while reference to the Tractus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 1922) is found on pp.163, 164, 165.

References

1. The references which appear in Thought and Things (the places where necessary information such as publishers, the year of publication, etc, is missing) are retained as they originally appeared.

Adrian, E.D. 1947. The Physical Background of Perception. Oxford University Press.

Aristotle  Metaphysics, translated by Sir. D. Ross.

Armstrong, D.M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of Mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic (2nd ed.). Gollancz.

Ayer, A. J. 1940. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan.

Berkeley 1710. The Principles of Human Knowledge.

Broad, C.D. 1925. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. Kegan Paul.

Cornford, F.M.  Plato’s Theory of Knowledge.

Heraclitus 1954. The Cosmic Fragments, edited by G.S. Kirk. Cambridge.

Hume, D. 1748. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.

Kant, I. 1966. The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Smith, N. K.

Keynes 1921. A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan.

Köhler, W. 1939. The Place of Value in a World of Facts. Kegen Paul.

Köhler, W. 1947. Gestalt Psychology. Liveright Co.

Langer, S.K.1942. Philosophy in a New Key. New American Library.

Lock, J. 1969. Essay on Human Understanding.

Mayor, R.G. 1951. Reason and Common Sense. Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited.

Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia Ethica.

Moore, G.E.1953. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. George Allen & Unwin.

Plato  Cratylus. H.N. Fowler’s translation.

Parmenides

Price, H.H. 1953. Thinking and Experience. Hutchinson's University Library.

Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy.

Russell, B. Principia Mathematica.

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Spearman, C. 1923. The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition. Macmillan.

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Wittgenstein, L. 1922. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus., Kegan Paul.

Wittgenstein, L. 1963. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Williams, L.P. 1965. Michael Faraday, Chapman and Hall.

2. Secondary References

[in English]

Denneson, T. J. 2007. “Wittgenstein on Seeing”.

www.infedels.org/library/modern/travis.denneson

Hawtrey, R., “Aspects”, read at the Friday Club about 1912, Hawtrey Papers 12/1, Churchill College, University of Cambridge.

Hawtrey, R., Good and Bad Trade: An Inquiry into the Causes of Trade Fluctuations, Constable & Company, 1913.

Hawtrey, R., Trade and Credit, Longmans, Green and Co., 1928.

Hawtrey, R. 1926. Economic Problem, Longmans, Green and Co.

Hawtrey, R. 1944. Economic Destiny, Longmans, Green and Co.

Hawtrey, R., Thought and Things, Hawtrey Papers, 12/1, Churchill College, University of Cambridge (unpublished).

Hawtrey, R., Right Policy: The Place of Value Judgements in Politics, Hawtrey Papers, 12/2, Churchill College, University of Cambridge (unpublished)

Heraclitus. 1954. The Cosmic Fragments, ed. By Kirk, G.S., Cambridge.

Hirai, T. 2012. Exploring Hawtrey's Social Philosophy through His Unpublished Book, Right Policy. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 34(2):169-192.

Keynes, J.M. 1921 (1973). A Treatise on Probability, Macmillan.

Keynes, J.M. 1926, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth 1845-1926, Economic Journal, March 1926.

Keynes, J.M. 1931. Ramsey as a Philosopher. The New Statesman and Nation.

Keynes, J.M. 1939. My Early Beliefs (in Two Memoirs, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1949).

Kurz, H. 2009. If Some People Looked Like Elephants and Others Like Cats, or Fish … (Review article of Brian McGuinness (ed.), Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Letters and Documents 1911-1951, Blackwell, 2008), European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 16-2: 361-374.

Ramsey, F. 1922. Mr Keynes on Probability. The Cambridge Magazine, January. Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Williams and Norgate.

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[in Japanese]

Arahata, Y. 2013. “Constancy and Fragility – Wittgenstein and Heidegger” Reserch into European Culture, Seijo University, Vol.32, pp. 35-97.　

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Hirai, T. 2000. “Retrospective Reflections － On My Early Beliefs” in T.Hirai, Keynes, Schumpeter, Hayek, Minerva Shobo (Ch.7. pp.169-186).

Hirai, T. 2002. Treatise on Probability and “My Early Beliefs”, History of Economic Thought, No.42.

Hirai, T. 2003. “Keynes as Philosopher and Keynes as Economist”, Sophia Economic Review, Vol.48, No. 1・2.                        

Hirai, T. 2007. “Welfare and Value － Hawtrey” in T. Hirai, Keynes and the Cambridge World, Minerva Shobo (Ch.5. pp.75-100).

Hirai, T. 2009. “Hawtrey － On Unpublished Book, Right Policy” in T. Hirai ed. The Cambridge Development of the View of Market Society, Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha (pp.113-136).

Hirai, T. 2009. “The View of Market Society in Cambridge － Survey” in T. Hirai ed. The Cambridge Development of the View of Market Society, Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha (pp.309-334).

Yonezawa, K. 2003. “What Kind of Meaning Did the Gestalt Psychology Have on the Development of Wittegenstein’s Philosophy?” Teikyo University Faculty of Literature (pp.211-253).